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SUMMARY 
 
An increased frequency of minor gas leakages from seals in the wellhead (WH) area have been 
detected and recently given an increased focus among companies on the Norwegian continental shelf. 
Among others have Statoil and Shell reported concerns regarding this problem and are working 
simultaneously to identify and solve the problem.  
There is however uncertainties in the industry related to how the problem regarding leakages in the 
WH can be solved, how critical the leakages actually are, the extend of the problem, and whether test 
of the seals actually can trigger a leakage itself or not. Questions regarding whether the seals should be 
tested on a general basis and regarding specific maintenance plans for the seals have been raised.  
It has not been a common practice over the last years to test the seals in the WH after installation. It is 
therefore difficult to evaluate the extent of this problem as very limited test data exist. In addition, 
integrity issues in connection to the small cavities in the WH do often show unambiguous test results.   
Three case studies of three wells at the Oseberg East installation (Statoil) will be presented in this 
thesis. The case studies have been carried out with the use of the exclusion methods, analysis of 
pressure and trends, tests results, and simulations of hypothetic scenarios. The main discoveries follow 
below: 
It is indicated that the leakages in the seal assemblies in the WH are caused by: 
 Design capabilities exceeded in operation  
 Unsuccessful conversion of producers with an inactive A-annulus to producers with gas lift.  
 Dirt and residual hydraulic oil from installation. 
 Problems related to vibration  
 Pressure tests of the DHSV  
 Faulty design of WH 
A review of the barriers on the wells concludes that the wells have in the first place two independent 
barriers that are possible to test. An additional third barrier gives increased safety against leakages to 
the atmosphere if seals fail.  It is not possible to test the seal in the third barrier without introducing a 
risk to damage a unidirectional seal in the secondary barrier. 
It is considered that the frequency of the leakages to the atmosphere is expected to increase with time. 
It is in particular expected that the total number of leakages will increase through the test ports. 
The consequences of these leakage rates are considered to be negligible compared with the rates of 
leakages that are considered to give high risk of explosion and/or fire. 
The leakages might however be of significant enough size to be detected by the gas-detector and 
thereby cause the production at the installation to be shut down.  
The test ports should be monitored and an increased focus on maintenance should be initiated. With 
these initiatives, leaks to the environment are considered to represent a negligible risk. 
It is a severe escalation of the leakage to cavities in the wellhead, if the consequence is that the 
unidirectional seal in the secondary barrier becomes weakened. This danger is reduced by being able 
to monitor the pressure between the elastomer seal and the unidirectional seal. 
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Examples of recommended compensating measures that will be discussed are: 
 Pressure monitoring 
 Use of foam around test plugs 
 Use of chemical sealant 
 Evaluate injection of nitrogen to cavities 
 
It is recommended to bleed of pressure in the WH cavities before performing test on DHSV or 
commencement of other well activities.   
New recommended accept criteria’s in the WH follows: 
 Operate the well with a 35 bar limit in the cavities  
 AC. for leakages :  
o 35 bar/24hr for internal leakages  
o 0,1 kg/s  for leakages  to the atmosphere  
The case studies that have been carried out are related to gas lift wells. There is however indication 
that minor gas leakages in the WH might exist on other types of wells as well. 
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4. BACKGROUND: 
 
The wellheads that are installed on the Norwegian continental shelf have a designed lifetime of 
approximately 20-30 years. Beyond this lifetime a reliability analysis has to be performed in order to 
be allowed to continue to produce from the well.  
During the designed lifetime of the wellhead, it is expected to fulfill the design requirements. Hence 
no leakages from the seals are expected. As of today, it is not common in the industry to test all the 
seals in the wellhead periodically after initial testing.  Despite the fact that the wellhead is designed to 
prevent any leakages during its designed lifetime, there have been observed leakages. 
An increased frequency on detected minor gas leakages from seals in the wellhead area led to an 
increased focus on this topic.  Among others has Statoil internally established a requirement to verify 
the integrity of the now possible wakened well barrier elements in the wellhead area. 
«R- 27189»: 
“There shall be no leakage through seals that are defined as barrier elements or through fire resistant 
seals” 
The requirement for periodic leak testing of seals only applies for seals in the wellhead tree available 
for testing from platform or onshore.  
“R-27189” is also the background for this master thesis.  
There is however uncertainties in the industry related to how the problem can be solved, how critical 
the leakages actually are, the extend of the problem and whether test of the seals actually can trigger a 
leakage itself or not. Questions regarding whether the seals should be tested on a general basis and 
regarding a specific maintenance plans for the seals, have been raised.  
These are some of the issues that will be discussed in this thesis.  
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5. DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION 
 
 
Figure 1 Wellhead and christmas tree (Camreron) 
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Figure 1 illustrates the wellhead (WH) and christmas tree (XT) system that this thesis revolves around.  
There are currently a lot of issues related to leakages to cavity C1 (Figure 2). It is indicated that the 
seals related to C1 are a weaknesses of the secondary barrier. 
 
Figure 2 WH Oseberg East (Cameron) 
The pressure in the cavity can due to an unknown leakage/reason start to increase. To solve the 
pressure increase there is a practice at Oseberg East to bleed off the pressure when it reaches a 
predefined pressure. This temporary risk reducing measures is only an opportunity for the wells which 
have pressure monitoring equipment located in connection to the cavity C1. 
It is indicated that the leakages in the seal assemblies in the WH are caused by: 
 Poor cleanliness during installation, which may have led to scratches and traces in the sealing 
surfaces.  
 Dirt and residual hydraulic oil from installation. The residual oil will then suffer from thermal 
expansion during production of the well and the pressure might exceed the design capacity of 
the seal or system.  
 Pressure tests of the DHSV might worsen the situation, as the seal then will suffer from an 
increased differential pressure across the seal. (The thermal expansion of the hydraulic oil can 
cause collapse of the seal) 
 The properties of the elastomer seals has a tendency to deteriorate over time and thereby 
reduce its sealing capacity 
 Problems related to vibration  
 Wrong applied test pressure 
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 Design capabilities exceeded in operation  
 Unsuccessful conversion of producers with an inactive A-annulus to producers with gas lift.  
 Faulty design of WH 
There exist different practices on how to deal with this situation in the industry. At some installations 
the seals in connection to the cavity are already being tested on a regular basis in order to verify the 
integrity of the barrier. The design on WH/XT may vary from installation to installations. This implies 
different accessibilities to test the seals and monitor the pressure in the annular cavity. Some wells 
have also been recompleted in order to solve problems related to leakages.  
There is however uncertainties in the industry regarding testing of these seals. The limited access 
possibilities imply that unidirectional seals might have to be tested in the opposite direction of their 
design capacity. Worst case scenario of applied test pressure from the wrong side of the seal is to 
actually waken the seal and thereby cause a leakage.  
 There exist several possible solutions to the problem, but their arguments are often contradictory. 
Examples of this are shown in the table below 
Table 1 Possible solution wekanesses 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possible solution Weakness of  solution 
Plug test port in connection to the 
leaking system  
Removes the possibility for further pressure and or 
temperature monitoring 
Use of sealant Removes the possibility for further pressure and or 
temperature monitoring 
Use pressure/ temperatures 
transmitters or indicators  
Weakens the fire integrity of the fire jacket 
Alarm automated pressure bleed off  Demanding for the personnel in the, in the control room 
on the installations 
Manual pressure bleed off  Time consuming 
Use of tandem seals  Requires an extra venting system to deal with the 
temperature induced pressure between the seals 
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6. THEORY 
 
6.1. Well integrity  
 
Well integrity is defined as an application of technical, operational and organizational solutions to 
reduce risk of uncontrolled release of formation fluids throughout the life cycle of a well. (Birgt 
Vignes, 2001) 
Primary well barrier if the first object that prevents flow from a source, and the secondary well barrier 
is the second object that prevents flow from a source. Well barriers (WB) are an envelope of one or 
several dependent well-barrier elements (WBEs) preventing fluid and gasses from flowing 
unintentionally from a formation into another formation, or to the surface.  
The WB is defined before commencement of an activity by description of the required WBEs to be in 
place and specific acceptance criteria. Well barrier acceptance criteria are technical and operational 
requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to qualify the WB for its intended use. 
In general the number of well barriers shall apply as follows: 
 
Figure 3 NORSOK barrier requirements  
The well barriers shall be designed, selected and/or constructed such that: 
 it can withstand the maximum loads and environment it may become exposed to 
 it can be leak tested and function tested or verified by other methods 
 no single failure of barrier or barrier element, whether caused by operational error or 
equipment failure, shall lead to uncontrolled release of wellbore fluids or gases to the external 
environment 
 re-establishment of a lost well barrier or another alternative well barrier shall be possible, also 
in a situation where the ordinary power source has failed 
 it shall function as intended in the environment (pressure, temperature, fluids) that may be 
encountered during the period it was intended for 
 physical position/location and integrity status of the well barrier is known at all times when 
such monitoring is possible. 
When the well barrier has been constructed, its integrity and function shall be verified by means of: 
 
 leak testing by application of a differential pressure 
 function testing of WBEs that require activation 
 verification by other specified methods 
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Re-verification shall be performed when; 
 the condition of the barrier element could have been changed since the initial/previous testing 
and/or 
 change in worst case loads/well design pressure for the remaining life cycle of the well 
(drilling, completion and production phase)   
 
Leak testing of well barriers or WBEs shall be performed: 
 before it can become exposed to pressure differentials, 
 after replacement of pressure confining components of the well barrier 
 when there is a suspicion of a leak, 
 when an element will become exposed to different pressure/load than it originally was 
designed for, 
 routine tests during operation. (Hans-Emil Bensnes Torbergsen, 2012) 
 
The pressure during testing shall as far as possible be applied in the direction of flow. If this is 
impractical, the pressure can be applied against the direction of flow, providing that the WBE is 
constructed to seal in both directions. 
 
In general the acceptance criteria are zero for leak tests. (through seals that are defined as barrier elements) 
However should activity specific leak testing requirements apply: 
Low pressure test: 5% deviation is accepted to account for temperature effect, air entrapment, media 
compressibility, but a decreasing trend – which approaches zero for minimum 5 min 
High pressure test: 2% deviation is accepted to account for temperature effect, air entrapment, media 
compressibility, but a decreasing trend - which approaches zero for minimum 10 min - shall be 
documented on the test curve 
Inflow test: Less than 3 bar/10 min deviation is accepted to account for temperature effect, air 
entrapment, media compressibility, but a decreasing trend (which approaches zero for minimum 10 
min) shall be documented on the test curve. 
Test pressure shall not exceed the test pressure the exposed elements have previously been tested to or 
working pressure/well design pressure/section design pressure. Degradation due to corrosion, wear, 
erosion etc. shall be accounted for. (Statoil, TR3507) 
The accept critearias mentioned above applies for drilling and well activities. 
Examples of how the application of requirement should be interpreted follows: 
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Figure 4 Theoretical test, approved 
Figure 4 illustrates a high pressure test that was cleared ok.  The pressure drops less than 2% for a 
minimum of 10 min and the slope of the curve has a decreasing trend, which approaches zero. 
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Figure 5 High pressure test, rejected 
Figure 5 illustrates a high pressure test that was not cleared ok.  The pressure drops less than 2% for a 
minimum of 10 min but the slope of the curve does not have a decreasing trend. Further investigations 
of the tested barrier element in this particular case, did however not show a leakage.  
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Figure 6 High pressure test. Approved offshore, but rejected onshore 
Figure 6 illustrates a high pressure test that was not cleared ok.  The pressure drops less than 2% for a 
minimum of 10 min but the slope of the curve does not have a decreasing trend. Further investigations 
of the barrier element confirmed that the element was leaking. 
The commonly accepted way of determining leak rates valves is by: 
 Bleeding down pressure above (downstream of) the valve 
 Closing in the volume above the valve and then monitoring the rate of pressure build up in that 
volume 
 Converting the pressure rise into a volume leak rate 
When testing valves for leaks, the status of all the valves in the system must be known, the 
temperature has to be stable and the differential pressures between the valves should be known.  A 
minimum differential pressure should also be specified. 
Loss of well integrity is either caused by mechanical, hydraulic or electric failure related to the well 
components, or by wrongful application of a device. To reduce risk of failure it is important to control 
the risk factors and to detect leakages at an early stage (before failure). 
The obvious consequences of loss of well integrity are blowouts or leaks that can cause material 
damage, personnel injuries, loss of production and environmental damages resulting in costly and 
risky repairs. Knowing that most of the wells in the North Sea have a large production rates, losses due 
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to production/injection stop may be very costly.  Often these losses exceed the cost of the repair of the 
well. 
It is crucial that the well barrier envelope is fire resistant in case a fire occurs in the wellhead area. 
Therefore all the barrier valves shall automatically move to safe position ensuring fire resistance in 
such cases. In addition all XT and wellhead seals that are part of the barrier envelope shall be fire 
resistant. Any lack of fire resistance will increase the risk of a fire, as the risk of putting the whole well 
on fire will become evident. 
 
6.2. Operational 
 
6.2.1. General 
 
The status of well barriers is to be known by monitoring the individual WBE of the well barrier 
envelopes during the production life of the well. This is commonly done by monitoring of annulus 
pressure and frequent leak testing of well barrier elements. 
The following requirements have been specified in NORSOK D-010: 
.1. Downhole safety valves, production tree valves and annulus valves shall be regularly leak 
tested. Leak test acceptance criteria shall be established and be available. 
.2. The pressure in all accessible annuli (A and/or B) shall be monitored 
.3. Registered abnormalities shall be investigated to determine the source of abnormalities and if 
relevant, quantify any leak rate across the well barrier.  
.4. Upon confirmation of loss of the defined well barrier, the production or injection shall be 
suspended and shall not re-commence before the well barrier or an alternative well barrier re-
established 
Individual well barrier elements are to be regularly functioning and leak tested in accordance with 
given test criteria. Generally, all well barrier elements are to be tested for leaks while valves that are 
included in the well barrier envelopes should also be function tested regularly.  
 
6.2.2. Annulus Pressure Surveillance Principles 
 
The pressures in all accessible annuli shall be monitored and maintained within minimum and 
maximum operational pressure range limits, to verify that the integrity status of well barriers is known 
at all times. Norsok D-010 states that the A-Annulus pressure for all wells and B-Annulus pressure for 
multi-purpose and annulus gas lift wells shall be monitored through continuous recording of the 
annulus pressure to verify the integrity of the well barrier. 
 
Well parameters such as temperatures and rates shall also be monitored to facilitate correct 
interpretation of pressure trends and identification of abnormal pressure behavior. 
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There are three main types of annular pressures encountered in wells: 
 Thermal Pressures 
 Applied Pressures  
 Sustained Casing Pressures. (Hans-Emil Bensnes Torbergsen, 2012) 
 
When the temperature and flow rate are stable the annuli pressures should also be stable. Abnormal 
pressure changes may indicate a failure in the barrier envelope, such as a leakage. Assessments of 
parameter trends over longer periods are required to make it possible to identify slow pressure build 
ups over time. Operating wells with positive annuli pressures and differences in tubing and annuli 
wellhead pressures will facilitate detection of abnormal pressures. 
 
6.3. Seal Design 
 
6.3.1. Definitions  
 
A seal is basically a device for closing a gap or making a joint fluid tight. Seals can broadly be 
categorized into two categories: 
 Static seal where sealing takes place between surfaces which do not move relative to one another. 
The primary application requirements for the static seals involve keeping liquid, gas or dirt out. A 
typical static seal is the O-ring. 
 Dynamic seal where the sealing takes placed between surfaces which have relative movement 
such as rotating shafts and pistons rings. (Borwn, 1995) 
A number of dynamic seals may however equally well be employed for static type seals. There are 
also static seals (by function) which are designed to accommodate limited movement of the surface 
being sealed.  These are sometimes called semi-static seals, but are more often described by purpose 
or application. 
There are also types of seals designed specially to prevent access of dirt, dust or other harmful 
contaminants into a system. These are called exclusion seals. 
 
6.3.2. Seal categories and types 
 
Static seals are normally described by type. (Such as gasket, ring seals, etc.) They may further be 
categorized by material or by construction.   
Sealants are regarded as a separate category. 
Dynamic seals fall into two main categories: 
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 Contact seals  where the seal bears against its mating surface under positive pressure 
 Clearance seals which operate without rubbing contact 
The majority of dynamic seals that are contact seals operating with rubbing and only separated and 
lubricated by a thin oil film.  Contact seals may further be categorized by: 
 Compression seals  
 Pressure-energized seals (Borwn, 1995) 
Dynamic seals are not part of the scope of this thesis, but sealing mechanism for the dynamic seals are 
often used in the static seals as well and will therefore further be explained. 
Compression seals generate radial pressure for sealing by squeeze imparted to a soft gland material 
radially. Compression of this type may be employed for both dynamic and static application.  They are 
also suited for sealing in both directions of motion and are thus double-acting seals. Their particular 
application is for heavy duty rod seals or rotary shaft seals. (Borwn, 1995) 
Pressure-energized dynamic seals fall into two categories. The first comprise solid elastomeric rings 
which are assembled in grooves with an interference fit. This imparts a squeeze or preload pressure, 
providing sealing in a static condition.  Under fluid pressure acting on one side of the seal through the 
clearance gap, the elastomeric section is deformed, increasing the interface pressure by an amount 
equal to the fluid pressure. Thus if the preload pressure is p and the fluid pressure is P, the effective 
pressure under working conditions is P+p. See Figure 7. Because P+p is grates than the actual sealing 
fluid pressure p, sealing is maintained. Seals of this type may be double-acting. 
 
Figure 7 Pressure energized seals 
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The other category of pressure-energized seals employs a hollow section with a flexible lip or lips. 
Again it is assembled with an interference fit giving a preload pressure p. Fluid pressure P acting on 
the section then further increases the interface pressure to p+P. Typical seal sections in this category 
are the u-ring and the v-ring. Seal of this type are single acting, which means that by pressure 
energization is effective in one direction only. Single acting seals might also be referred to as 
unidirectional seals.  
There are further types of ring seals which combine both modes of working. They incorporate a 
flexible lip section fitted with a solid elastomer ring. Some of these may also incorporate back-to-back 
configuration to produce double acting seals. 
 
6.3.3. Mechanism of sealing 
 
Static seal aim to provide a complete physical barrier in a potential leakage path to which they are 
applied. They are zero leakage seals. To achieve this, the seal must be resilient enough to flow into and 
fill any irregularities in the surface being sealed and at the same time remain rigid enough to resist 
extrusion into the clearance gap. Both requirements must be long term. Resilient flow is produced by 
closure loading, stressing the seal in compression. Contact pressure pressure is then maintained by 
stored elastic energy in the complete seal system. Performance will be degraded by any stress 
relaxation which may occur in the system. This may be caused by: 
 Stress relaxation in the seal material itself (which may also be associated with creep into the 
clearance space) 
 Differential thermal expansion 
 Flange deflection or bolt stretch 
In the theory the greater the stored elastic strained energy of the seal and thus the greater margin 
available to resist any relaxation effects in service. This is largely true up to the point where the seal 
material itself is damaged by excessive compression and suffers a permanent loss of properties. 
 
6.3.4. Wear and seal life 
 
Because of their different designs, and because they are produced from different materials, sealing 
systems have varying behavior patterns at increasing operating pressures. When a hard material is 
used, the danger of damage by compression is being reduced. On the other hand a hard material does 
not have such good sealing characteristics as a soft material, particularly at low pressures. For the best 
sealing system that are effective at high and low operating pressures, a seal constructed from several 
types of material with different properties is needed.  
Seals lose their ability to function because of normal wear of the seal material. The first indication of 
leakage is seen at low pressures. This is because of wear and the seal is no longer capable of 
maintaining the required contact with the sealing surface. At high pressures, because the deformation 
is greater, sealing may continue to be adequate so long as the pressure is maintained.  
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Elastomer seal 
Definition: a material capable of 100% elongation (Borwn, 1995) 
  
              
              
  
  
   
 
Where 
E is the Young's modulus (modulus of elasticity) 
F is the force exerted on an object under tension; 
A is the original cross-sectional area through which the force is applied; 
ΔL is the amount by which the length of the object changes 
L is the original length of the object. 
 
All rubber components deteriorate over a period at high temperatures, especially in air. They become 
brittle and lose their elastic property. See Figure 8. This effect is time dependent, irreversible and 
varies considerably from one elastomer to another. 
At temperatures below 0°C rubber compounds progressively stiffen and loser their resilience as the 
temperature falls, until brittleness occur. The brittleness is reversible when the temperature rises again, 
as long as cracks not already have appeared in the rubber component. Additives to the elastomer may 
be added to provide a greater resistance to stiffening at low temperatures.  
It is known that when the rubber becomes immersed in certain fluids, the tolerance of the rubber 
compound to significantly higher temperatures can be much lower compared to its operating pressure 
in dry heated air. 
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Figure 8 Ageing effects on rubber 
An elastomer in contact with a fluid will tend to absorb a certain amount of the fluid and the elastomer 
will swell as a consequence of this. This will tend to modify the properties of the elastomer such as 
hardness, strength, resilience and abrasion resistance. Such changes are usually acceptable and 
inevitable, but an excessive swell may indicate lack of compatibility.  
6.3.4.1. Joule Effect 
Joule effect- when a stretched rubber is heated it does not elongate, but tries to contract. (Borwn, 
1995). The modulus of elasticity increases with a rise in temperature. Joule effect does not occur if the 
rubber is not stretched when heated.  
 
6.3.5. Safety and environmental health 
 
Environmental health works both ways, as far as the seals are concerned. The environment itself has a 
considerable influence on seal selection. At the same time, the purpose of a seal is to protect the 
environment from contamination. The meaning of contamination in this context may range simply 
from avoiding messiness and product loss to the elimination of contamination of nauseous, toxic or 
hazardous fluids by fully containing them to the surface.  
From either aspect, the basic problem involved is the same and starts with the selection of the most 
suitable seal for the job. This must take into account all the environmental factors involved.   
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External environmental problems are far more likely to arise where the atmosphere is contaminated or 
incompatible with simple materials. Contaminated air may in cases not injurious to health, but can 
cause metallic corrosion. 
Internal factors are primarily concerned with the sealed fluid, the operating parameters and the 
installation design. Some of these factors may need consideration: 
 Fluid pressure 
 Fluid temperature 
 Fluid viscosity 
 Fluid nature (lubricator or not) 
 Cleanliness 
 Chemical activity of product 
 Toxicity 
 Vapour pressure, which may dictate degree of temperature control required 
 Entrained air, which can cause accelerated wear at faces of mechanical seals 
These factors are essential in the process of determine the seal type, material and design. 
 Other design and operating parameters are: 
 Available space, which may restrict the type of seal 
 Motion 
 Quality control 
 Eccentricity, which can seriously influence seal performance. Particularly in the case of lip seals. 
 Vibration 
 
6.3.5.1. Vapour emission 
Direct vapour emission from “zero-leakage” or “dry” seals is possible. This can cause unexpected 
danger where the product is hazardous. Especially as the vapour emission may be invisible. 
A common problem is that single seals emit vapour even where there is no visible leakage of fluid.  
Factors most likely to lead to increased vapour emission: 
 Increased fluid pressure 
 Higher fluid volatility 
 Pump stop or start of intermitted duty 
 
6.3.5.2. Environmental control 
There are basically three types of environmental control: 
 Temperature controls 
 Controls for dirty or incompatible environment 
 Safety controls 
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The temperature at which the seal works is a vital operating parameter. It governs seal wear and life 
and also it’s resistant to chemical attack. It also affects the behavior of the fluid being contained, as 
well as the behavior of the seal itself. Available temperature controls are: 
 Jacket cooling or heating 
 Bypass flush 
 Heat exchanger 
 Air cooler 
6.3.5.3. Safety controls 
There are two basic approaches to controlling leakage in the event of seal failure. One is use of tandem 
seals which will prevent leakage of the process fluid to the atmosphere. Tandem seals are two seals set 
in the opposite direction of each other, sealing the same gap 
 The other is to use single seal but make provision for restraining and collecting leakage. 
 
 
6.4. Calculation methods 
 
6.4.1. Temperature induced B-annulus pressure 
 
During well testing and production a significant amount of heat is transported up the wellbore. The 
temperature will decrease throughout the well. If closed annuli are present, the temperatures expansion 
of fluid inside these can cause a significant pressure rise. In extreme cases the pressure increase can 
cause the well equipment to burst or collapse. 
The following demonstrates the temperature induced pressure with an example. 
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Figure 9 Simplified temperature profiles in a well during various phases 
 
Figure 9 shows a fictive temperature profiles during production of the well and the static temperature 
profile for a closed in well. These are considered the two extreme cases. Assuming a linear 
temperature profile, the changes in temperatures can be expressed as: 
At wellhead: 
          
Eq.1 
At the bottom of the well/DHSV:  
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Having a total volume V in the cavity or annulus, free expansion of this volume subjected to the 
temperature change of equation 1, we obtain: 
  
 
 
 
 
            
Or if we insert the actual temperatures from equation 1, we obtain: 
 
  
 
   
     
 
 
     
 
  
Eq.2 
(Aadnøy, 2010) 
We observe that the volume change is proportional to the average temperature change. 
During production, from Figure 9, T2=T4.  Hence  
      
In the case of pressure evaluations in the wellhead, we do also only consider the temperature change in 
the wellhead area. 
Eq. 2 becomes: 
  
 
          
 
Eq.3 
 
 
To consider the pressure element, first imagine that the fluid is allowed to expand freely according to 
equation 3. Then the fluid is compressed back to its initial volume. The pressure required is: 
   ( 
  
 
)( 
  
 
) 
 Or by inserting equation 3 
 
   (
  
 
)         
Eq.4 
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Where: c= compressibility of the fluid 
               = heat expansion coefficient  
Equation 4 gives an estimate for the temperature-induced pressure in a closed cavity, assuming that the 
mass of the fluid remains constant.  
In the derivation above only fluid behavior is studied. The casing and the rock compressibility is 
assumed negligible.  
 
6.4.2. Equation of state 
 
For ideal gas 
       
Van der Waal’s equation for real gases 
(  
   
  
)            
(Lide, 2007) 
 
6.4.3. Pressure drop calculations   
 
In this section an equation for calculating the rate of leakage through a leaking sealing section will be 
derived. 
In general there exist two flow regimes in this setting, laminar and turbulent flow. For a pressure drop 
over a leaking sealing section the flow regime will in worst case scenario be turbulent.  For a relation 
between pressure drop and flow rate for Newtonian fluids the following relation exist: 
       
Eq. 5 
Where: 
P= pressure drop 
q= flow rate 
ρ= fluid density 
f= friction factor 
 
The flow rate through the sealing section is given by the continuity equation: 
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or 
   
 
  
            
 
  
 
 
Eq.6 
Where: 
v= velocity 
A= area 
(The subscript a refers to cavity C1 and b to sealing section) 
Using the conservation of principle, and assuming an incompressible an frictionless system, the 
pressure drop across the sealing section is: 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Eq.7 
Pressure drop over sealing section can be defined by: 
        
Eq.8 
Combining eq. 7 and eq.8: 
 
   
  
 
 
(  
    
 ) 
Eq.9 
From experimental measurements, it is found that the flows is not ideal and somehow lower than 
prediction by the equation above. A discharge coefficient of 0,95 is often used. Introducing these 
elements and the continuity relation, the above equation can be expressed as: (Aadnøy, 2010) 
       √
  
 
 
Eq. 10 
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Or 
  
   
         
 
Eq. 11 
(Aadnøy, 2010) 
This equation can be used to determine the flow rate of leakage.  
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7. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
 
7.1. Surface Completions 
 
7.1.1. Christmas tree (with XT valves and exit blocks) 
 
The XT normally consists of a main housing with annulus and production blocks directly mounted 
onto the main housing with large bolts. The main housing and blocks have internal bores which are 
fitted with integral valves. The XT is equipped with a connector at the bottom which is used to attach 
it to the wellhead or tubing head either with a clamp or locking screws.  
The XT is normally equipped with pressure and temperature monitoring and a facility to inject 
corrosion/scale inhibitor and MEG/methanol for hydrate inhibition during shut in and testing. (Hans-
Emil Bensnes Torbergsen, 2012) 
The function of the X-mas tree is to: 
 Provide a flow conduit for hydrocarbons from the tubing and into the surface lines with the 
ability to stop the flow by closing the flow valve or the master valve. 
 Provide vertical access into the wellbore. 
 Provide an access point where kill fluid can be pumped into the tubing.  
 
The XT is placed on top of the WH. Figure 10 illustrates different types of dry XT. 
 
 
Figure 10 Different types of dry X-mas trees (Cameron) 
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7.1.2. Wellhead 
 
The primary purpose of a WH is to provide the suspension point and pressure seals for the casing 
strings that run from the bottom of the hole section to the surface pressure control equipment (XT or 
BOP). The WH seals are usually part of the secondary well barrier envelope in the wells. 
Figure 11 illustrates a surface wellhead system. The different casing strings are supported in the 
wellhead in separate casing hanger spools with annulus access for pressure monitoring. The X-mas 
tree is stacked on top of the wellhead. 
Wellheads are typically welded onto the first string of casing, which has been cemented in place 
during drilling operations, to form an integral structure of the well.  
 
 
Figure 11 Wellhead system (Cameron) 
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7.1.3. XT-connection 
 
The XT connection is the connection between the XT and the WH and is normally part of the 
secondary barrier envelope. 
For dry trees there is normally a seal installed between the top of the tubing hanger and the XT inner 
bore and a seal between the wellhead and the XT body. It is normally possible to leak test in between 
the two seals before an internal test is performed by pressuring up the inside of the production tubing 
and the XT production bore. The XT tree is locked to the wellhead either by using locking screws or a 
clamp. Figure 12 illustrates a XT connection. 
 
 
Figure 12 Illustration of XT locked to the WH by lock down screws (Cameron) 
 
 
 
7.1.4. Casing hanger seal 
 
The casing hanger is the portion of a WH assembly which provides support for the individual casing 
strings when it is lowered into the wellbore. It is usually welded or screwed to the top of the surface 
casing string and serves to ensure that the casing is properly located. When the casing string has been 
run into the wellbore, it is hung off by a casing hanger, which rests on a landing shoulder inside the 
casing spool. Casing hangers (Figure 13) provide a seal between the casing hanger and the spool and 
are usually part of the secondary well barrier envelope in production wells. 
 
Most casing heads allow for the pressure readings to be taken on the annulus and provide the means to 
pump out or into if necessary. The top of the casing string and annulus is usually sealed. 
Wellhead  
Lock down screws 
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Figure 13 Example of a casing hanger with sealing elements (Hans-Emil Bensnes Torbergsen, 2012) 
 
 
7.1.5. Annulus valves 
 
For a dry WH the annulus valves are used to access the different annuli in between tubing and casing 
and between the different casings in the well. Depending on well configuration one or several of the 
annulus valves are often a barrier element in one of the barrier envelopes against the reservoir.   
The WH is often equipped with two bores into each annulus where two annulus valves are installed 
onto one bore and one valve and pressure cap is installed on the other side.  The exact valve 
configuration will vary from field to field. The valves are also used to increase or reduce the pressure 
in the annuli and if needed also top up the fluid level.  
The annulus is also normally equipped with two valves where the valve closest to the well is kept open 
for monitoring purposes. One or several temperature and pressure gauges are installed in between the 
two valves in X-mas tree annulus block. (Hans-Emil Bensnes Torbergsen, 2012)      
 
7.1.6. Tubing hanger with seals 
 
The tubing hanger consists of a steel body with external seals and normally one bore in the middle, but 
it can also consist of several bores. The tubing hanger has often an internal profile for a plug to be 
installed.    
The function of the tubing hanger is to:  
 Support the weight of the tubing string 
 To isolate the A annulus and the tubing bore at the wellhead 
 Provide  seals between:  
.1. Production tubing and wellhead 
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.2. Production tubing and x-mas tree  
 Allow for control line penetration with seals for e.g. downhole safety valve, downhole pressure 
and temperature gauges and provide a profile for a tubing hanger plug.  
Figure 14 illustrates an example for a tubing hanger with control lines. 
 
 
Figure 14 Tubing hanger installed in dry wellhead with control line feed through (Cameron) 
 
7.2. The barrier envelopes 
 
Figure 15 and Figure 16 illustrates the WB envelopes and the WBE of a producing well, without and 
with gas lift. The blue elements are part of the primary barrier and the red elements are part of the red 
barrier. 
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Figure 15 WB envelopes for a well, shut in, but in production (D-010) 
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Figure 16 WB envelopes of a gas lift well, shut in, but in production (D-010) 
 
7.3. Fire resistant envelope 
 
Normally the following equipment shall be covered by the fire resistant envelope (Figure 17): 
 Wellhead / Christmas tree connector  
 Upper actuated master valve  
 Lower manual master valve  
 Inner valve at A - Annulus (production annulus) 
 Control line exit block in wellhead / christmas tree 
 Tubing head 
 Tubing hanger and seal assembly / packoff 
 Casing hanger and seal assembly / packoff from A - Annulus (production annulus) and up 
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Figure 17 Fire resistant envelope (Statoil, TR3540) 
 
For wellhead systems with active gas lift or production through the A-annulus, the equipment that 
shall be covered by the fire resistant envelope is the same with the exception of 
 Casing hanger and seal assembly / packoff from B - Annulus and up 
And an extra element 
 Inner valve at B – Annulus 
is included in the envelope. See Figure 18. 
 
Fire resistant envelope 
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Figure 18 fire resistant envelope for wells with an active A-annulus (Statoil, TR3540) 
 
The same qualification requirements are valid for casing / tubing hanger packoff’s and/or seal 
assemblies, but not including the bend test. (Statoil, TR3540) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fire resistant envelope 
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8. REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
8.1. NORSOK D-010 rev 3 
 
8.1.1. Table 33 – Surface production tree 
 
Norsok D-010 rev.3 defines the surface production tree to be an element that consists of a housing 
with bores that are fitted with swab -, production master, kill- and flow valves.  
 
8.1.1.1. Design, construction and selection  
The following is specified in NORSOK D-010 with respect to design, construction and selection of 
seals in surface production tree:  
 All primary seals shall be of metal-to-metal type.  
 All connections, exit blocks etc. that lies within a predefined envelope shall be fire-resistant. 
 
8.1.1.2. Test requirements 
There are not stated any specific requirements regarding testing of seals.  
 
8.1.2. Table 5 Wellhead 
 
Norsok D-010 rev.3 defines the wellhead to be an element which consists of the wellhead body with 
annulus access ports and valves, seals and casing/tubing hangers with seal assemblies. 
The following is specified in NORSOK D-010 with respect to the seals.  
8.1.2.1. Initial test and verification  
The wellhead bodies and seals, annulus ports with valves and the casing or tubing seal assemblies 
shall be leak rested to maximum expected shut in pressure for the specific hole section or operation.  
8.1.2.2. Use 
A wear bushing should be installed in the wellhead whenever movement of tools/work- strings can 
inflict damage to seal areas.  
8.1.2.3. Failure modes 
Failure of the stated requirements will lead to:
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 Leaking seals or valves 
 
5.1.3. Table 10 Tubing hanger 
 
Norsok D-010 rev.3 defines the tubing hanger to an element which consists of body, seals and a bore 
which may have a tubing hanger plug profile. 
8.1.2.4. Initial test and verification 
The primary seal shall be tested in the flow direction. 
The hanger seal can be tested against the flow direction. 
If only single seals are used in the tubing hanger, annulus is to be tested. In the case of double seal, an 
in-between seal test might be performed. 
8.1.2.5. Failure modes 
Failure of the stated requirements will lead to:
 
 Leaking seals or valves 
 
8.1.3. Table 12-Well head/ Annulus access valve 
 
Norsok D-010 rev.3 defines the wellhead / annulus access valve to be an element which consists of the 
wellhead housing and an isolation valve. 
8.1.3.1. Monitoring 
Sealing performance shall normally be monitored through continuous recording of the annulus 
pressure measured at the wellhead level.  
8.1.3.2. Failure modes 
Failure of the stated requirements will lead to: 
 Inability to maintain a pressure seal 
 Seaping or sweating valve surface  
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8.2. NORSOK D-010 rev 4 draft 
 
(A draft of the new version of NORSOK D-010 (rev 4) was published during the work of this thesis. A 
NORSOK D-010 rev. 3 and the draft of rev. 4 has therefore compared in order to detect possible new 
requirements regarding seals in WH) 
5.2.1 Table 32- Surface production tree  
 
NORSOK D-010 rev. 4 defines the surface production tree in the same manner as NORSOK D-010 
rev. 3. 
NORSOK D-010 rev. 4 sets the same requirements to design and construction for the surface 
production tree equally, as Norsok D-010 rev. 3. 
There are not stated any new requirements regarding testing of seals.  
 
8.2.1. Table 5 Wellhead 
 
NORSOK D-010 rev. 4 defines the wellhead in the same manner as NORSOK D-010 rev. 3. 
8.2.1.1. New requirements 
Monitoring: 
Accessible seals shall be periodically leak tested, first time within 1 year then at a maximum frequency 
of two years.  
 
8.2.2. Table 9 Tubing hanger 
 
NORSOK D-010 rev. 4 defines the tubing hanger in the same manner as NORSOK D-010 rev. 3. 
8.2.2.1. New requirements 
Initial test and verification: 
 All seals shall be tested in the direction it is designed to hold pressure. 
Monitoring: 
 Accessible seals shall be periodically leak tested, first time within 1 year then at a maximum 
frequency of two years.  
 
8.2.3. Table 11-Well head/ Annulus access valve 
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Norsok D-010 rev. 4 defines the the wellhead / annulus access valve to be an element which consists 
of the wellhead housing, the XT/wellhead connection and an annulus isolation valve. 
8.2.3.1. New requirements 
New requirement regarding monitoring, but not directly related to the seals.  
 
8.3. API 
 
8.3.1. Valve Test Criteria 
 
According to API 14B, the acceptable leak rate of a valve or well barrier element is to be zero, unless 
specified otherwise.  
The petroleum industry has only one defined leak rate, which is the maximum leak rate for SSSVs. 
According to API 14B, the allowable leak rate of SSSVs has been defined as: 
 0.42 Sm3/min (25.5 Sm3/hr) (900 scf/hr) for gas 
 0.4 l/min for liquid 
The API 14B criteria can also be used as allowable leak rates when testing other valves such as 
production tree valves, annulus access valves, and CIVs providing the observation volume is 
adequately large to give meaningful tests and the valves are connected to a closed system. 
For situations where the leak-rate cannot be monitored or measured, a criterion for maximum 
allowable pressure fluctuation is to be established. 
 
 
8.4. TR 3504 Surface wellhead and Christmas tree system 
8.5. General design requirements  
 
All bolt-on valve connections towards the WH housing and XT block within the fire resistant envelope 
shall have dual metal-to-metal seals with the possibility to pressure test both seals individually. The 
control line block towards the WH connection is a secondary seal and hence a single metal-to-metal 
seal is acceptable. 
The chemical injection block terminations towards the cross in the XT tree block shall in addition have 
a metal-to-metal check valve installed in the XT tree block, to ensure two metal-to-metal seals towards 
the production medium. Optional a chemical injection block connection with dual metal-to-metal seals 
shall be used. 
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All permanently installed non-metallic seals (primary and secondary/test seal) shall be resistant to the 
rapid gas decompression requirements and compatible with each individual fluid environment. See 
section under Abbreviations 
The WH to XT interface design shall provide a minimum of two independent sealing surfaces between 
the tubing hanger bore and the atmosphere, one located in WH/XT connection and one located 
between the tubing hanger neck and the XT bore. 
The WH and XT instrumentation shall be performed by utilizing anti-vibration type compression 
fittings (e.g. Autoclave® or Butech® type fitting). 
Autoclave® and Butech® are high pressure coned-and-threaded connections. 
 
 
8.5.1. General qualification requirements 
 
8.5.1.1. Seals 
Metallic seals shall be qualified in accordance with ISO 10423 F.1.11.  
Non-metallic materials and manufactures shall be qualified in accordance with ST076 and qualified in 
accordance with ISO 10423 F.1.11 and F.1.13. 
Non-metallic primary seals such as stem seals, and all non-metallic secondary sealing exposed to 
production fluids or gas, shall be of the rapid gas decompression resistance type in accordance with 
ST076 (NORSOK M-710). All seals and back up components shall be compatible with the individual 
fluid environment.  
Primary seals in contact with hydrocarbons or part of the well barrier system, shall be of metal-to-
metal design or minimum fire resistant design and tested using Nitrogen. 
Installation of the seals for the test fixture shall simulate actual installation conditions and the test 
fixture shall simulate real behaviour including thermal effects and axial movements. 
The seal design shall be qualified for intended use, e.g. leak tightness from both directions where 
applicable. Each individual seal, including its application, individually or as part of a seal arrangement 
/ seal stack, shall be fully qualified.  
Both primary and secondary sealing functions shall be qualified. 
No visible indications of welds in the sealing area are allowed.  
The seals should be protected during transportation to avoid damage on the sealing surface.  Damage 
on the sealing surface is a common reason for leakages through the seals.  
 
8.5.2. Technical specifications wellhead 
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The wellhead should be of a compact type, and one of two options: 
 A starting head and one piece multibowl housing comprising the casing and tubing hangers as 
shown by the principles of Figure 19.  
 A starting head, a casing head housing comprising the casing hangers, and a drill through tubing 
head comprising the tubing hanger as shown by the principles of Figure 20. 
Complete assemblies shall be qualification tested. Individual seals, as well as complete seal assemblies 
including locking mechanism, shall be qualified. Qualification testing performed on individual parts, 
shall only be considered complete upon retesting with the component parts fully assembled, tested and 
qualified as a complete assembly. Preferably the component shall be functioned and run using field 
installation tools during the qualification test. 
If metal-to-metal lip seals are used in the wellhead they shall be installed in by utilizing an appropriate 
tool. 
The wellhead shall be equipped with test ports for integrity testing of all system seals from the exterior 
of the wellhead. All test ports shall be in doublets for effective testing, set 180° apart. Test port fittings 
to wear a protective pressure sealing cap, with integrated vent function, to detect and enable a 
controlled release of any trapped pressure behind the sealing cap. All threaded test / vent ports within 
the fire resistant envelope shall be of an Autoclave® or Butech® type connection. 
 
Figure 19 Typical compact wellhead / mulitbowl assembly nomenclature (Statoil, TR3540) 
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Figure 20 Typical split drill through type wellhead assembly nomenclature (Statoil, TR3540) 
 
 
 
8.5.2.1. Annulus Pack-off and Seal assembly 
The annulus pack-off and seal assemblies are barrier elements and pressure controlling components, 
and shall be designed according to the principles of ISO 10423. 
Casing and tubing hanger annulus seals shall be of a bi-directional metal-to-metal design, retrievable 
without having to pull the casing or tubing hanger and certified for the life of the field. 
As a minimum, the seal assembly for the production casing and tubing hanger shall be of a fire 
resistant design. 
See also section “ 
Fire resistant envelope” for further details. 
For standardization purposes same pack-off or seal assembly shall be used throughout in multi-bowl 
systems. Use of tie-down bolts shall be avoided.  Pack-off and seal assembly shall be run through a 
drained rise 
 
8.6. Conclusion/ the minimum accepted requirements 
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All equipment used in WH and XT shall be designed for and entirely suitable for twenty years in 
continuous operations at specified duty, unless specifies otherwise in project specific requirements. 
When equipment is to be modified or otherwise altered, latest editions of the standards shall apply. 
The equipment shall be designed to comply with Statoil’s barrier philosophy for the overall system. 
The system shall provide fail-safe features such that any single failure will not result in an unsafe 
system condition. There should always be two independent barriers and in cases where this is not 
feasible, risk reducing measures should be implemented.  
Normally the following equipment shall be covered by the fire resistant envelope: 
 Wellhead / Christmas tree connector  
 Upper actuated master valve  
 Lower manual master valve  
 Inner valve at A - Annulus (production annulus) 
 Control line exit block in wellhead / christmas tree 
 Tubing head 
 Tubing hanger and seal assembly / packoff 
 Casing hanger and seal assembly / packoff from A - Annulus (production annulus) and up 
For WH systems with active gas lift or production through the A-annulus, the inner valve at B- 
Annulus is also part of the fire resistant envelope.  
All bolt-on valve connections towards the WH housing and XT block within the fire resistant envelope 
shall have dual metal-to-metal seals with the possibility to pressure test both seals individually. The 
control line block towards the wellhead connection is a secondary seal and hence a single metal-to-
metal seal is acceptable. 
The chemical injection block terminations towards the cross in the XT block shall in addition have a 
metal-to-metal check valve installed in the XT block, to ensure two metal-to-metal seals towards the 
production medium. Optional a chemical injection block connection with dual metal-to-metal seals 
shall be used. 
All permanently installed non-metallic seals (primary and secondary/test seal) shall be resistant to the 
rapid gas decompression requirements and compatible with each individual fluid environment. 
The WH and XT instrumentation shall be performed by utilizing anti-vibration type compression 
fittings. 
The seal design shall be qualified for intended use, e.g. leak tightness from both directions where 
applicable. Complete seal assemblies shall be qualification tested. Testing performed on individual 
parts, shall only be considered complete upon retesting with the component parts fully assembled, 
tested and qualified as a complete assembly. 
The WH and XT should be equipped with test ports for integrity testing of all system seals from the 
exterior part. All test ports, bleed ports or other valve body penetrations shall be equipped with 
fittings, Autoclave® type or plugs with metal-to-metal sealing. 
Valves leaking above allowable criteria, or other leaking components in the barrier envelope, require a 
commitment to repair within a certain time-frame . 
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9. CASE STUDY OF WELL A-1, A-2 AND A-3 AT OSEBERG EAST 
 
In the following chapters case studies regarding leakages through seals in connection to cavity C1 will 
be presented. See Figure 21.The full case study of a well named A-1 will be presented, as well as the 
major topics from the case study of well A-2 and A-3. All of these three wells are located at the 
Oseberg East installation.  
 
 
 
Figure 21 WH Oseberg East (Cameron) 
 
9.1. Wellhead configuration of well A-1, A-2 and A-3 
 
All wellheads at the Osberg East installation have Cameron wellheads. The specific WH 
configuration, which is relevant for this particular case study, for the wells A-1, A-2 and A-3 are 
described in the following chapters. (There is installed an add-on wellhead on A-1, but this will not 
affect the system boundaries of the system that will be discussed in this case evaluation) 
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9.1.1. Standard Snap Ring Modular Compact Wellhead System  
 
Cameron's standard snap ring modular compact (SSMC™) wellhead system (see Figure 22), has been 
developed as a total system to cater for the different requirements of working pressure and casing 
programs that may be encountered, but utilizing a minimum number of components that are 
interchangeable within the system. This approach for the various components allows flexibility and 
considerably reduces inventory, particularly since seal assemblies are identical for each stage and 
interchangeable between elastomeric and metal/metal. (Cameron sealing technology ) 
Elastomeric and metal seal assemblies are interchangeable. 
 
 
Figure 22 SSMC™ wellhead system (Cameron) 
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9.1.2. Straight Bore Radial Lip Metal Seal- SRL  
 
The 'SRL' seal (Figure 23)   is a pressure energized unidirectional, straight bore seal. An initial sealing 
interface is created by radial interference of each seal lip when installed into the mating seal bore. 
Pressure acts on the unbalanced portion of each lip to produce the contact forces necessary for high 
pressure sealing, and limits the bearing stresses to prevent damage to the mating seal surfaces. The 
'SRL' seal sub is used in tubing hanger necks for an internal flush radial seal provides a center hub 
region that is sized to support the pressure loading. This seal may be installed into a pocket without 
reliance on radial support from the mating housing. The 'SRL' flange or bonnet gasket provides for a 
minimally sized center hub and must be installed into a mating counterbore with close tolerance fits to 
carry the radial pressure loads, while providing a more compact design. (Cameron sealing technology ) 
 
 
Figure 23 SRL seal (Cameron) 
 
 
9.1.3. Metal End Cap Seal (MEC) 
 
MEC seals (Figure 24) are radially squeezed, pressure energized elastomeric annulus seals.  Metal 
shells provide a zero gap extrusion barrier that eliminates exposing the elastomer material to the 
corrosive well bore environment.  MEC seals can tolerate surface imperfections such as those caused 
by casing centralizers.   
The MEC assembly is a seal that offers the advantages of metal-to-metal seals and elastomeric seals.  
The MEC seal itself consists of a robust elastomeric seal that is encapsulated by 316 stainless steel 
metal end caps.  The metal end caps have interference fits with the wellhead body and casing hanger 
body.  Tests have proved that the end caps isolate the elastomer from fluid in the annulus.  The 
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elastomer however permits the seal to seal on scratches and mechanical damage in the wellhead bore. 
(Cameron sealing technology ) 
 
 
Figure 24 MEC seal (Cameron) 
 
9.1.4. LS Elastomer Seal 
 
LS-seal is an elastomer seal with the following features: 
 Cost-effective 
 Radiused seal face protects during installation. Large cross section for better sealing. 
 Application: Non-metal-to-metal rated for 10,000 psi and below. 
 Method to Energize Seal: Radial interference using stainless steel garter springs to prevent 
extrusion. (Cameron sealing technology )  
 
 
Figure 25 LS seal (Cameron) 
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9.2. Case Study, Oseberg East well A-1 
 
The case study of the well A-1 at the Oseberg East follows. 
 
9.2.1. History of the well A-1 
 
 Drilled in 2001 
 WO 2007 due to A to B annulus communication below the annulus safety valve 
 WO 2010 due to: 
  A to B annulus communication, caused by a leak in the 10 3/4” x 7 5/8” tie back 
  Additionally, two small leaks have been identified in the wellhead, one from the A 
annulus to the tubing hanger cavity, and the other across the SRL seal to the tubing 
hanger cavity. 
 Additional leaks in connection to C1 was seen in February 2011 
 Cameron performed tests in August 2012 that confirmed the leaks 
The A-1 well was originally drilled and completed in 2001, with a simplified casing plan. The well 
had a 28” conductor, 13 3/8” intermediate casing, and 10 ¾” x 9 5/8” production casing. The reservoir 
section was cased with 7” liner, and perforated. The original completion was a 7” x 5 ½” gas lift 
design, with a dual FLX annulus safety valve. 
The 10 ¾” x 9 5/8” (NSCC) production casing developed A to B annulus communication below the 
annulus safety valve, and the well was suspended. 
The well was worked over, and recompleted in 2007. An HX-4 plug was set in the 5 ½” tubing below 
the SABL production packer, the tubing was then cut and retrieved above the packer. In order to 
provide a more robust gas lift solution, the production casing was cut above the 13 3/8” shoe. A Read 
Hydraulic Expandable Tubular System (HETS) patch was run, and connected to the top of the 9 5/8” 
casing stub. The 9 5/8” casing was then tied back to the 13 3/8” casing with an FLX liner hanger 
packer. This allowed a new 10 ¾” x 7 5/8” tie back string to be run, creating an additional annulus, 
and therefore giving a more robust design for a gas lifted well. 
At this point the HX-4 plug was to be retrieved, as it would not be possible to retrieve it through the 
new completion. However, it was not possible to retrieve the plug, and it was eventually pushed to 
bottom (4659m mD).The well was recompleted with 5 ½” x 4 ½”production tubing, utilising a 10 3/4” 
x 5 ½” dual FLXannulus safety valve (ASV), gas lift, four mandrels, a downhole pressure and 
temperature gauge, and a chemical injection valve for scale inhibition. 
In 2009 the well suffered loss of casing integrity, with A to B annulus communication, caused by a 
leak in the 10 3/4” x 7 5/8” tie back. Additionally, two small leaks have been identified in the 
wellhead, one from the A annulus to the tubing hanger cavity, and the other across the SRL seal to the 
tubing hanger cavity. 
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A Well Leak Detector (WLD) tool was run in September 2009, but the operation was unsuccessful in 
determining the point of the leak due to several difficulties experienced during the operation. The main 
problem was the inability to initiate and maintain a consistent leak across the casing, at sufficient rate 
for the WLD to identify. (Macrae, 2010) 
The well was suspended in October 2009 and recompleted in 2010.  
A schematic of the completion is shown in Figure 26 below. The monitoring well barrier schematic of 
the well is shown in Figure 27. 
 
6/28/2013  
 Page 55 of 123 
 
Figure 26 Well sketch A-1 
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Figure 27 WBS A-1 
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9.2.2. Deviation history 
 
According to the Statoil deviation system, the following deviations have been registered for the well 
A-1 (Synergy numbers) 
 94410 Diagnosis for pressure build up in B annulus, gas bled off 10 ¾» seal and leakage seen 
past SRL seal (April 2011) 
 100334 Diagnosis for pressure build up in B annulus (3/12-12/12). Mentions SRL leak. 
o Actions: fill B annulus  
 102413 Diagnosis for internal leakages XT/WH (7/12-9/12) 
o Actions: - Leakage rate to SRL seal, leakage rate to XT cavity. Limit SRL seal to 
35bar diff pressure 
 103738 To produce the well with current issues: 
o XT/WH internal leakages 
o Historic build leak in B annulus via 10 ¾» seal (very slow increase in B annulus ) 
 
Figure 28 Risk status Code, A-1 
 
Based on the exclusion method, analysis of pressure trends (Figure 29 and Figure 30) as well as the 
tests performed by Cameron in August 2012 diagnosis of the wellhead leakages over the last years has 
been made. The main discoveries will be presented below. 
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Figure 29 Temperature and pressure trends in WH/XT A-anulus, A-1 (Sally Serenyi) 
 
Figure 30 Temperature and pressure trends in WH/XT B-anulus, A-1 (Sally Sereny) 
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9.2.2.1. Historic pressure build up in C1 
 Pressure build up to tubing pressure in tubing hanger neck seal (SRL) seal monitor port. See 
Figure 31. 
 Leak rate 0,00003 l/hr 
 Actions: bleed off pressure at 35 bar 
 Crude oil seen during bleed off 
 
 
Figure 31 WH illustration of pressure build up in SRL cavity 
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 Historic (2012) pressure build up in C1. See Figure 32 
 Higher than tubing pressure 
 Leak rate 0,08 l/hr 
 Current build up seen in C1. Figure 32. 
 Not higher than tubing pressure 
 Leak rate 0,12 l/hr 
 
 
Figure 32 WH illustration of pressure build up in C1 
 
This case does give unambiguously indications of the origin of the leakage, but by evaluating the 
Cameron test results as well as the pressure history of the well, it is possible to conclude that the 
integrity between A-annulus and C1 is intact. (Due to the low leak rate/ pressure build up)  However 
the pressure at the tubing hanger monitor port is slowly rising. 
 
9.2.2.2. Historic build up in B-annulus and 10 ¾” seals  
A small pressure build up has been detected, but no gas where sampled under the last pressure bleed 
off. See Figure 33 
 B-annulus pressure increased by 3bar in 2 months 
 10 ¾” casing hanger seal pressure increased by 15 bar in 2,5 months 
Actions: 
 Gas bled off, but not sampled 
 B-annulus filled with treated brine 
? 
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 VAL-TEX 80 pumped inside, excess grease removed with hydraulic oil and pressure tested to 
150 bar nitrogen. The test was cleared ok. 
 
 
Figure 33 B-annulus and 10 3/4" seals leakages 
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9.2.2.3. Cameron test August 2012 
Table 2 shows a summary of the tests performed by Cameron in August 2012 on the well A-1. Further 
details of the tests are shown in the appendix. 
Table 2 Summary Camreon test August 2012 
 Seals Integrity Reference 
SRL seal monitor port 
cavity 
SRL seal  YES Test nr 3-Some crude oil where detected during 
pressure bleed off  
Test  (6)- Stable pressure ~24 bar  
Elastomer seal  Inconclusive  Need more info – the SRL seal test 
C1 Elastomer seal  
CF-18 gasket  YES Daily «sniffing round». No indications of leakages 
Exit block YES Daily «sniffing round». No indications of leakages 
Control line feed 
thru fittings  
NO Tester (1) & (2)- show pressure build up in C1but a 
stable pressure in TH-seal. By us of the exclusion 
method- leakages through control line fittings 
Plott (6) shows a long term pressure increase in C1. 
Test (7) shows that gas is bled off from cavity  
TH seal-upper YES Test (2) indicates that integrity of the upper seal is ok 
with 120 bar. 12 bar in C1 and 126 bar in A-annulus 
 
Tubing hanger seal 
monitor port cavity 
TH seal -upper 
TH seal lower YES Plot (6) shows that the pressure increases from 6- 
bar in two months. The pressure in C1 has during 
that time frame reached 35 bar several times 
10 ¾” seal monitor port 
cavity 
10 ¾” seal - upper YES Plot (5) Stable pressure ~95 bar +/- 5 bar for 1,5 
months  
Stable A-annulus pressure ~130bar +/-  5 bar 
10 ¾” seal - lower YES Plot (5) Stable pressure ~95 bar +/- 5 bar for 1,5 
months  
Stable B annulus pressure ~45 bar +/- 2 bar 
13 3/8” seal monitor port 
cavity 
13 3/8” seal-
upper 
YES Plot (5) shows a pressure increase from 14-16 bar in 
1,5 months  
Stable B annulus pressure ~45 bar +/- 2 bar 
13 3/8” seal-
lower 
YES Plot (5) shows a pressure increase from 14-16 bar in 
1,5 months  
No functional C annulus 
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Comments to the tests: 
 Hydraulic oil were bled off in test nr 7, otherwise the fluid that was bled off was either crude 
oil or gas  
 
 
 
9.3. Case Study, well A-2 
 
The case study of the well A-2 at the Oseberg East follows. 
 
9.3.1. History of the well A-2 
 
 A-2  is an  oil producer with gas lift 
• The well was originally drilled and completed in 2000 
•  Recompleted Jan 2012 
• Internal WH/XT leaks was first observed in Jan 2012 
• There has also been documented pressure build up on C annulus 
• Cameron performed seals tests Aug 2012 
A schematic of the completion is shown in Figure 34 below. The monitoring well barrier schematic of 
the well is shown in Figure 35. 
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Figure 34 Well scetch A-2 
 
 
 
6/28/2013  
 Page 65 of 123 
 
Figure 35 WBS E-4B 
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9.3.2. Deviation history 
 
According to the Statoil system for deviations the following deviations have been registered for the 
well A-2 (Synergy numbers) 
Table 3 Risk status code, A-2 
 
 
Based on the exclusion method, analysis of pressure trends (Figure 36 and Figure 37) as well as the 
tests performed by Cameron in August 2012, diagnosis of the wellhead leakages over the last years 
has been made. The main discovery will be presented 
 
 
Figure 36 Pressure trends in WH/XT, 1, A-2 
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Figure 37 Pressure trends in WH/XT, 2, A-2 
Comments to Figure 36 and Figure 37 
 The pressure in C1 follows the pressure in SRL-cavity. The pressure is higher than the tubing 
pressure. Hence, the source of the pressure increase must be the A-annulus. 
 The frequency of the manual pressure reliefs are reduced  
 This is a one-way leakage from C1 to the SRL-C as the pressure in the SRL-cavity 
follows the pressure at increases from C1 but not reductions from C1. The volume of 
the SRL-cavity (less than 100ml) is not sufficient to affect the pressure in C1 (25l) 
 The pressure at the tubing hanger (S3) is slowly rising after production starts. It is indicated as 
small leakage from the A-annulus. (The pressure of the B-annulus is lower) 
 At production start the pressure in SRL-cavity increases to 70 bar. Hence the SRL seal must 
have been deformed and communication between C1 should be the consequence.  
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Figure 38 Annuli trend, 1, A-2 (Sally Sereny) 
 
Figure 39 Annuli trend, 1, A-2 (Sally Sereny) 
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Comments: 
 The B-annulus pressure increases after the first production start. This might be temperature 
induced pressure. 
 At production start an even pressure increase at the 10 ¾” seal is observed. Might indicate at 
small leakage from B-annulus or C-annulus 
 
 
9.3.2.1. Historic pressure build up in C1 
 Pressure in SRL-cavity higher than tubing pressure. See  
 Pressure in C1 is rising  
 Leakrate 1.9 l/hr 
 Leak path:  from C1 to SRL, not from SRL to C1. Hence the pressure build up must come 
from the A-annulus 
 Cameron test Aug 2012 proved that the leakage did not come from the tubing hanger itself  
 Conclusion: Leakage from A-annulus to C1 goes via the control line fittings. See Figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40 WH illustration of pressure build up in C1 A-2 
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9.4. Case Study well A-3 
 
The case study of the well A-3 at the Oseberg East follows. 
 
9.4.1. History of the well A-3 
 
• Well A-3 is an oil producer with gas lift 
• The wall was drilled and completed Aug-2000 
• Internal WH/XT leaks first observed sept ’10 
• In Aug 2012, leak into C1 escalated 
• Approved deviation in place to produce the well 
• Recompleted in april 2013  
Since the well was recompleted during the work of this thesis the analysis has been performed based 
on the status of the well in February 2013. 
A schematic of the completion is shown in Figure 41 below. The monitoring well barrier schematic of 
the well is shown in Figure 42. 
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Figure 41 Compleation A-3 
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Figure 42 WBS A-3  
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9.4.2. Deviation history 
 
According to the Statoil system for deviations the following deviations have been registered for the 
well A-3 (Synergy numbers) 
 
Table 4 Risk status code, A-3 
 
 
Based on the exclusion method, analysis of pressure trends (Figure 43 and Figure 44) as diagnosis of 
the wellhead leakages over the last years has been made. The main discovery will be presented 
 
 
Figure 43 WH trend A-3 
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Figure 44 Annuli trend A-3 
 
9.4.2.1. Historic pressure build up in C1 
See Figure 45. 
 Historic build up in 10 ¾" and TH seal monitor port ~ 130 bar  
 Build up seen in C1 Leakrate ~17,8 litres/hr  
 Actions: greased both 10 ¾" and TH seal 
 Currently ~130bar seen in 10 ¾" and TH seal monitor ports 
 Slow build up seen in XTC today leakrate ~0,2 litres/hr 
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Figure 45 WH illustration of pressure build up in 10 3/4" seal and TH seal monitor port, A-3 
 
See Figure 46 
• Historic pressure-build up seen in SRL seal monitor port. 
• Currently SRL seal monitor port is following tubing pressure. It is a one way leak since it 
builds up when WH pressure is high, but does not bleed off when WH pressure is lower 
 
 
Figure 46 WH illustration of pressure build up in C1, A-3 
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9.5.  The well barriers 
 
The well barrier elements on well A-1, A-2, A-3 in connection to C1 are identical for all three wells 
and will now be discussed. 
 
 
Figure 47 WH Oseberg East (Cameron) 
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It is required to have two independent and tested barriers. This is fulfilled by: 
Barrier 1 (annulus): ASV is a valve located in A- annulus.  It is held open by hydraulic pressure and it 
is possible to leak test it by bleeding off the pressure above the valve. 
Barrier 1 (tubing): DHSV is a hydraulic operated valve, located in the tubing. It is held open by the 
hydraulic pressure, and it is possible to test the valve by closing it, and then bleed of the pressure on 
top of it. 
Barrier 2 (annulus, S3): This is a metal seal assembly which is designed like a reverse “V” and has 
increasing sealing capacity along with increasing annulus pressure. The sealing capacity of the 
assembly can be measured by monitoring the pressure of cavity (C1). 
Barrier 2 (tubing, S1): This is a SRL-seal which seals between tubing head and XT. It is possible to 
monitor the integrity of S1 by monitoring the pressure between S1 and an elastomer seal located 
between S1 and C1. 
Barrier 3 (S2 & S4): Both S2 and S4 are metal to metal seals. It is an extra barrier between the 
reservoir and the atmosphere and can be tested by pressuring up the cavity. This test is however 
associated with a risk to damage S1. 
 
 
Barrier Annulus  Test possibilities Tubing Test possibilities 
Primary 
ASV Pressure tested by 
closing the valve 
and bleed of the P 
DHSV Pressure tested by 
closing the valve 
and bleed of the P 
Secondary 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between tubing 
head and 
tubing hanger 
(S3) 
Monitoring 
possibility, but a P 
test will not give an 
unambiguously 
result 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between tubing 
head and XT 
(S1) 
Monitoring 
possibility, but a P 
test will not give an 
unambiguously 
result 
Third  
Metal seal 
assembly 
between tubing 
hanger and XT 
(S2) 
Metal seal 
assembly, exit 
block (S4) 
Pressurizing C1. 
(introducing risk of 
damaging S1) 
Metal seal 
assembly 
between tubing 
hanger and XT 
(S2) 
Metal seal 
assembly, exit 
block (S4) 
Pressurizing C1. 
(introducing risk of 
damaging S1) 
Table 5 Barrier elements and test possibilities 
A sketch of the system boundaries shown on Figure 48 
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Figure 48 Barriers of A-1 
 
System 
boundaries  
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9.5.1. Discussion of the barriers  
 
Barrier 1, the ASV and the DHSV, are independent and gives clear indications of errors when testing.  
Barrier 2 in tubing (S1) and annulus (S3) are independent, separate seal assemblies. In case of a 
leakage through these seals, both of them will pressurize the cavity (C1). In order to determine 
whether it is S1 or S3 that is leaking, additional pressure bleed offs in annulus or tubing have to be 
performed.   
Barrier 3 (S2 and S4) will normally not be exposed for hydrocarbons, unless S1 or S3 is leaking. The 
sealing functionality of S2 and S3can be tested by pressurizing the cavity. This test is however 
considered to be a possible risk factor of damaging S1.  S1 are rated to 345bar from the tubing side. 
Cameron does not guarantee for pressure sealing in the opposite direction (from C1). A maximum 
pressure limit of 10 % of the WH design pressure (345bar) is however used as a common limit for the 
pressure on S1 from the C1 side. (Based on recommendations from FMC on other similar Statoil 
installations)  
There exist an elastomer seal behind S1 on the cavity side which has full rating (345bar) from both 
directions. The elastomer seal is however not considered to have the same reliability as the metal seal 
assembly. There exists therefore a monitor port to measure the pressure between the SRL-seal and the 
elastomer seal in S1. As long as the elastomer seal is functioning it will however protect S1 from the 
high pressure introduced from pressure testing of S2 or S4. 
9.5.1.1. Conclusion, discussion of the barriers  
A review of the barriers on the gaslift wells A-1, A-2, A-3 concludes that the well has in the first place 
two independent barriers that are possible to test. S2 and S4 give an additional third barrier and 
increased safety against leakages to the atmosphere in case S1 or S3 fails. It is not possible to test S2 
and S4 with an unambiguous result, without introducing a risk to damage S1. 
 
9.6. Evaluation of the barriers with a leakage in the SRL seal (S1) 
 
Leakages in S1 have among other been detected on the wells A-1 and A-2. 
A leakage between the tubing hanger and wellhead will weaken the secondary barrier and in worst 
case result in failure of the secondary barrier. In this case the secondary barrier element, S1, is not 
intact and not possible to test directly. (With reference to Figure 47 and Table 5) A leakage to the 
atmosphere is prevented by S2 and S4 being intact. The same applies for all test ports in connection to 
C1.  
It is possible to continuously monitor the situation by monitoring the pressure in C1and SRL-test port 
and bleed of the pressure when it reaches a predefined limit.  
The remedy for such leakages might be to inject VAL-TEX80 over the seal assembly S1. This is 
however only a temporary solution, as the results of the treatment are not unambiguous and it is 
common to eventually see that the pressure increases in cavities again.  Another negative effect of 
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using VAL-TEX80 or other grease sealants is that the grease blocks for further use of pressure 
monitoring in the specific area. 
The status of wells with a leakage in S1 can be summarized: 
 Two independent barriers in the tubing are still intact.  
 It is possible to test them both 
In the case of a leakage through S1, C1 could be exposed to the following pressure (See Table 6): 
 Well flowing pressure 
 
Table 6 Seals exposed to the following pressures 
Barrier 
Failure of 
barrier in A-
annulus  
Exspected introduced 
pressure to C1, due to 
barrier element failure 
Failure on 
barrier in 
tubing 
Exspected introduced 
pressure to C1, due to 
barrier element 
failure 
1 ASV P from injection gas DHSV Well flowing P 
2 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between 
tubing head 
and tubing 
hanger (S3) 
1. P from injection gas                         
2. Controlline P 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between 
tubing head 
and XT (S1) 
Well flowing P                          
3 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between 
tubing 
hanger and 
XT (S2) 
Metal seal 
assembly, 
exit block 
(S4) 
1. P from injection gas                         
2. Well flowing P                         
3. Controlline P 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between 
tubing 
hanger and 
XT (S2) 
Metal seal 
assembly, 
exit block 
(S4) 
1. P from injection gas                         
2. Well flowing P                         
3. Controlline P 
 
 
9.7. Evaluation of the barriers with a leakage in the tubing hanger seal and through control 
line fittings (S3) 
 
Leakages in S3 have among other been detected on the wells A-1, A-2 and A-3. 
A leakage between the tubing hanger and wellhead will weaken the secondary barrier and in worst 
case result in failure of the secondary barrier. In this case the secondary barrier element, S3, is not 
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intact. (With reference to Figure 47 and Table 5) A leakage to the atmosphere is prevented by S2 and 
S4 being intact. The same applies for all test ports in connection to C1.  
It is possible to continuously monitor the situation by monitoring the pressure in C1 and bleed of the 
pressure when it reaches a predefined limit. In order to define whether it is the tubing hanger seal, 
control line fittings or the control line fittings that are leaking, additional pressure bleed offs and build 
ups through tubing hanger test port has to be performed.  
The remedy for such leakages can be to inject VAL-TEX80 over the seal assembly S3 if it is the 
tubing hanger seal that is leaking.  
The status of wells with a leakage in S3 can be summarized: 
 Two independent barriers in the tubing are still intact.  
 It is possible to test them both, but the test on S3 is however considered to be a possible risk 
factor for introducing damage on S1.  
In the case of a leakage through S3, C1 could be exposed to the following pressures (See Table 6): 
 Pressure from the injection gas                          
 Control line pressures 
 
9.8. Evaluation of the barriers with temperature induced pressure in C1 
 
In addition the leakages that are diagnosed on well A-1, A-2 and A-3 it is evaluated that the 
temperature induced pressure in cavities may cause damages on the seals and WH. 
A temperature increase in the wellhead, due to for example production start, will result in a pressure 
increase in C1. Assumed that the temperature in C1 follows the temperature of the WH. Simulations of 
this scenario have been performed and an extract of the calculations are shown in the tables below. 
(For further details, see appendix). 
It is assumed that the cavity is either filled by: 
a. Oil or water (Table 7) 
b. Air or gas (Table 8) 
The method of “Temperature induced B-annulus pressure” has been used in the simulation of Table 7.  
From the method of “Temperature induced B-annulus pressure”, Eq 4: 
  (
  
 
)         
 
Where: c= compressibility of the fluid 
               = heat expansion coefficient  
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In the simulation it is assumed that the relation between the compressibility of the fluid and the heat 
expansion coefficient are the same for oil and water. 
(
  
 
)
     
 (
  
 
)
   
 
The method of ideal gas has been used for simulations of Table 8 and thereby it is assumed that the 
gas is ideal. 
For both of the simulation methods it is assumed that C1 has fixed system boundaries and hence, no 
fluid will escape from C1 during the temperature/pressure increase.  
 
Table 7 Temperature induced pressure in C1 (oil or water filled).  
New pressure in C1 due to 
wellhead temperature increase 
(bara) 951 751 501 401 351 341 301 151 51 
Initial temperature in  C1 (°C) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wellhead temperature (°C), 
increase from 0°C 95 75 50 40 35 34 30 15 5 
  
        
  
New pressure in C1 due to 
wellhead temperature increase 
(bara) 901 701 451 351 301 291 251 101 1 
Initial pressure in  C1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Wellhead temperature (°C), 
increase from 0°C 95 75 50 40 35 34 30 15 5 
  
        
  
New pressure in C1 due to 
wellhead temperature increase 
(bara) 801 601 351 251 201 191 151 1 -99 
Initial pressure in  C1 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Wellhead temperature (°C), 
increase from 0°C 95 75 50 40 35 34 30 15 5 
 
Table 7 shows that at only a temperature increase of 35°C will give a pressure of 351bar which is 
higher than the design rating of 345 bar of the WH. Hence a larger temperature increases then 34°C 
will cause the pressure to increase sufficiently to damage the seals and/or the entire WH.    
The simulation did also show that a temperature increase of only 3,5°C will cause the pressure in 
cavity (when it is completely filled with oil or gas) to increase sufficiently to overcome the predefined 
rating  of 35 bar for unidirectional seals (S1). (S1 is designed to see 345bar from the tubing side, but 
not from side of C1) 
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Table 8 Temperature induced pressure in C1 (gas/air filled or with a mixture of gas/air and water/oil).  
Start production 14.02.2011 
      New pressure in C1 due to wellhead 
temperature increase (bara) 5,15 4,92 4,70 4,47 4,25 4,13 
Initial pressure in C1 (bar) 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Initial temperature in  C1 (°C) 82 82 82 82 82 82 
Wellhead temperature (°C), increase 
from 0°C 95 75 55 35 15 5 
       Revisjonsstans 17.05.2011 
      New pressure in C1 due to wellhead 
temperature increase (bara) 2,30 2,23 2,16 2,09 2,02 1,99 
Initial pressure in C1 (bar) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Initial temperature in  C1 (°C) 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wellhead temperature (°C), increase 
from 0°C 95 75 55 35 15 5 
       12.12.2011 
      New pressure in C1 due to wellhead 
temperature increase (bara) 10,25 9,75 9,25 8,74 8,24 7,99 
Initial pressure in C1 (bar) 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Initial temperature in  C1 (°C) 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Wellhead temperature (°C), increase 
from 0°C 95 75 55 35 15 5 
       
       29.06.2012 
      New pressure in C1 due to wellhead 
temperature increase (bara) 17,78 16,87 15,96 15,05 14,14 13,68 
Initial pressure in C1 (bar) 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Initial temperature in  C1 (°C) 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Wellhead temperature (°C), increase 
from 0°C 95 75 55 35 15 5 
 
Table 8 shows a more realistic case as it is more likely that C1 will either be filled with air/ gas or with 
a mixture of air/gas and oil/water. In the case where C1 might be filled with a mixture of liquid and 
gas, the gas will contribute as the controlling force in pressure calculations since it is more 
compressible than water or oil. Hence the method of “ideal gas” can also be used for the simulation of 
C1 filled with a mixture of air/gas and oil/water. 
A pressure increase of 5 bar is the highest simulated value for temperature induced pressure increase  
In the case of pressure increase above 34,5 bar the following may occur: 
 Leakage out through  the test ports to the atmosphere  
 Leakage out exit block 
 Leakage through SRL-test port 
 Leakage through SRL seal to tubing 
 Leakage through tubing hanger seal to A-annulus 
 Leakage through control line fittings  
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In addition to C1, there exists smaller cavities in the WH, which may suffer from temperature induced 
pressures. 
 SRL-cavity, less than 100ml 
 TH-seal cavity, less than 200ml 
 10 ¾”-seal cavity, less than 200ml 
Due to the small volumes, the pressure in those cavities will increase more rapidly and thereby may 
cause damage on the connecting seals.   
 
9.9. Fire integrity on the wellheads at Oseberg East 
 
As a consequence of the requirements from NORSOK and API, S1, S2, S3 and S4 should be fire-
resistant. The seal assemblies should withstand an external fire and have a minimum of leakages after 
the exposure of the fire. This requirement is under normal circumstances met by the metal seal 
assemblies.  
The fire resistant requirement is however not met on wells with leakages from S1, S3 or CL. The 
treatment with VAL-TEX80 cannot be considered to satisfy this requirement.  
The test ports in connection to C1 are not fire resistant. To compensate for this, a fire-jacket around 
the wellheads is used.  
 
9.10. Danger indications under normal operations 
9.10.1. Escalation of the leakage to the atmosphere 
 
The cavity C1 fills up with gas due to the leakage in S1, S3or CL. The size of the leakage through S1, 
S3 or CL determines how fast the pressure increases in C1. The total volume of C1 is 15 liters and the 
pressure build up could take anywhere from a few hours to several days. 
The gas in C1 will pressurize and be exposed to a number of possible leak paths towards the 
atmosphere: 
 Test ports  
 S2 
 S4 
S2 and S3 are reliable metal seal assemblies which under normal operation of the well should have a 
low probability for leakages. (Wellmaster) 
The plugs in the test ports are on the other hand evaluated to have a higher probability for leakages. It 
has been found that the plugs turn themself out of the ports due to vibration. It has also been found that 
“lock tight” is not a reliable method to lock the plugs.  
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The leakage area will be very small as long as the plugs are still tightened to the test port. 1mm
2
 hole 
opening has been used as the smallest area of leakage. The rates of leakage at different pressures in C1 
are shown in the table below: (The values of the pressures are picked from the calculated values under 
“Evaluation of the barriers with temperature induced pressure in C1” 
Table 9 Leak rates at different pressures in C1 gas filled. Several calculations in appendix 
Pressure (pa) Density methan  (kg/m3) Leak rate (m3/s) Leak rate (kg/s) 
514642 2,4 0,004 0,0011 
230480 2,4 0,003 0,0007 
1025129 2,4 0,006 0,0015 
1778397 2,4 0,008 0,0020 
 
Table 10 Leak rates at different pressures in C1 oil/water filled. Several calculations in appendix 
Pressure (pa) Density oil (kg/m3) Leak rate (m3/s) Leak rate (kg/s) 
95100000 0,9 0,100191483 0,0090 
90100000 0,9 0,097522077 0,0088 
80100000 0,9 0,091951074 0,0083 
 
The results from Table 9 and Table 10 show that the leakages will be less than what normally is being 
considered in a risk evaluation. 0,1 kg/s are in “NORSOK Z-013” being used as cut-off for how small 
leakages that are being considered.  
In the case where the plug is cut loose from the test port, the result will be a spontaneous emission of 
25 liters of gas.  The size of the equivalent stoichiometric cloud is in” Brage risiko og 
beredskapsanalyse” determined to be: 
Table 11 Size of gas cloud due to a spontaneous emission (Scandpower A/S, 1998) 
Pressure in cavity, 
C1 
Gas cloud sixe 
(m3) 
34 bar 2,4 
80 bar 5,6 
160 bar  10,8 
 
The data in Table 11are based on calculations for a similar case at the Brage installation. The main 
difference is that C1 in the WH on the Brage installation are only 15l. (Compared to 25l on Oseberg 
East).The calculated stoichiometric clouds can there for not directly be applied for the WHs on 
Oseberg East. In addition the geometry in the WH area as well as assumptions regarding wind may 
also differ. It does however give an indication regarding the expected size of the cloud and the 
potential risk related to the emission. 
The calculations of the gas cloud size are based on the assumption that 50% of the gas that was 
released contributes to equivalent stoichiometric cloud. 
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All of the calculated gas clouds were significant less than the gas clouds that are evaluated to give a 
high enough pressure to create an explosion at the wellhead area. (Scandpower A/S, 1998) 
 
9.10.1.1. Conclusion, leakages to the atmosphere  
 
It is evaluated that the frequency of the leakages to the atmosphere is expected to increase. It is in 
particular expected that the total number of leakages will increase trough the test ports. 
The consequences of these leakages are evaluated to be negligible, as the actual leakages are small 
compared to the rates of leakages that are considered to contribute to risk of explosion in “NORSOK 
Z-013”. 
It should however be pointed out the leakages could be of significant enough to be detected be the gas-
detector and thereby cause the production at the Oseberg East installation to be shut down.     
All of the calculated gas clouds for the Brage installation are significant less than the gas clouds that 
are evaluated to give a high enough pressure to create an explosion at the wellhead area. 
The test ports should be monitored and an increased focus on maintenance should be initiated. With 
this initiative, leaks to the environment are considered to represent a negligible risk. 
 
 
9.10.2. Escalation of leakages to tubing  
 
It is expected that it is possible to get a higher pressure in C1, than what S1 is dimensioned for.  
As mentioned earlier S1 is rated to 345 bar from the tubing side, but Cameron does not guarantee for 
any pressure in the opposite direction (from C1). S1 will under normal conditions not see any pressure 
from the C1 direction due to the elastomer seal that is located between S1 and C1. The elastomer seal 
is rated to 345 bar. As mentioned earlier the elastomer seal is however considered to be a less reliable 
seal. (Wellmaster). The integrity of the elastomer seal is monitored by the monitor port between the 
elastomer seal and S1. 
In the case of a weakened elastomer seal, and a pressure build up in C1, S1 could be exposed to the 
following pressures:   
 Pressure from the injection gas   
 Control line pressure 
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Table 12 Seals exposed to the following pressures 
Barrier 
Failure of 
barrier in A-
annulus  
Exspected introduced 
pressure to C1, due to 
barrier element failure 
Failure on 
barrier in 
tubing 
Exspected introduced 
pressure to C1, due to 
barrier element 
failure 
1 ASV P from injection gas DHSV Well flowing P 
2 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between 
tubing head 
and tubing 
hanger (S3) 
1. P from injection gas                         
2. Controlline P 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between 
tubing head 
and XT (S1) 
Well flowing P                          
3 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between 
tubing 
hanger and 
XT (S2) 
Metal seal 
assembly, 
exit block 
(S4) 
1. P from injection gas                         
2. Well flowing P                         
3. Controlline P 
Metal 
sealassembly 
between 
tubing 
hanger and 
XT (S2) 
Metal seal 
assembly, 
exit block 
(S4) 
1. P from injection gas                         
2. Well flowing P                         
3. Controlline P 
 
All of these pressures will be higher than what S1 is rated for. Hence it follows that gas from C1 will 
blow into the flow in the tubing. The amount of gas blowing into the tubing is very limited and it is not 
expected to be noticed in other ways than a pressure decrease in C1. 
The problem related to this situation is that S1 might get permanent deformation, which in turn causes 
S1 to lose its integrity. This is considered to be a significant weakening of the secondary barrier.  
 
9.10.3. Conclusion, leakage to tubing  
 
It is a severe escalation of the leakage to C1, if the consequence is that S1 becomes weakened due to 
the pressure build up in C1. 
This danger is reduced by being able to monitor the pressure between the elastomer seal and S1. 
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9.10.4. Escalation of other leak paths  
 
There exist possibilities to get leakages from the control lines. The pressure in the control lines are less 
than 600 bar.  It is therefore not possible that the gas can leak from C1 to the control lines and further. 
It is on the other hand possible to get leakages from the control lines to C1.  
 
9.11. Danger indications in case of fire 
 
9.11.1. Loss of integrity due to pressure increase  
 
In case of fire where the WH becomes exposed to the fire, a significant pressure increase in C1 will 
occur. The pressure increase in C1 is illustrated in the table below. The calculations are based upon 
two different gas temperatures as a result of the fire and 9 different initial pressures in C1. The 
calculations are also based upon the case the fluid will be trapped in C1 and does not have the 
possibility to escape from its origin. The gas temperature before heating is set at 85°C. The 
calculations in Table 13 and Table 14 are also base on the case that the gas will be trapped in C1, and 
does not have the possibility to escape back from its origin. 
Table 13 Pressure in C1 under different loads due to fire oil/water filled cavity 
Fire load (temp in gas)  °C New pressure in C1 due to wellhead temperature increase (bara) 
1 5 10 35 55 80 90 110 120 
1000 9991 9951 9901 9651 9451 9201 9101 8901 8801 
650 6491 6451 6401 6151 5951 5701 5601 5401 5301 
 
Table 14 Pressure in C1 under different loads due to fire gas filled cavity 
 
One of the consequences of fire is that elastomer seal will melt. The elastomer seal is not rated for 
such high temperatures that a fire will cause. Only the metal seals will be able to maintain its 
functionality under the temperatures of a fire. 
In the case where the pressure in C1 increases to 110-120bar, which is the injection pressure, it is 
possible that the pressure will exceed the WH and XT design pressure at 345bar.  This may cause 
damages which in worst case scenario may cause the WH and XT to lose its integrity.  
It is on the other hand more likely that the seals will open when the pressure from C1 increases. This 
will result in a pressure relief from C1 to the tubing, but more severe: a permanent deformation of the 
seals and consequently a loss of the barrier elements integrity. 
Fire load 
(temp in gas)  
°C 
Initial pressure in C1 (bara) 
1 5 10 35 55 80 90 100 110 120 
1000 3,6 17,8 35,5 124,4 195,5 284,4 319,9 355,5 391,0 426,6 
650 2,6 12,9 25,8 90,2 141,8 206,2 232,0 257,8 283,5 309,3 
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9.11.1.1. Conclusion, pressure build up due to fire 
 
The consequence of the melting elastomer seal is that S1 becomes exposed to pressure from C1.  If the 
initial pressure in C1 is greater than 10 bar it is likely that S1 will be exposed to a pressure above 34,5 
bar, and thereby introducing a risk of damaging S1. 
 
9.11.2. Escalation of fire due to leakages  
 
It has been identified several leak paths associated with C1 earlier in this theses. 
In the case of a fire, the test ports with “lock tight” plugs will start to leak. The leakages will be small 
and the amount of gas that will be fed to an ongoing fire will be very small. The problem related to 
this is however the increased difficulty to extinguish the fire. The leakages from the test ports will also 
increase the duration of the fire. The duration of the fire has to be evaluated based on the information 
from Error! Reference source not found.” and the fact that S1 and S3 are connected to a bigger 
olume of hydrocarbons, the A-annulus volume down to the ASV and the tubing volume down to the 
DHSV respectively. The volumes are 9,85 m
3
 and 32,85m
3 
respectively. 
Since there has been found leakages at several numbers of wells at Oseberg East , it is likely that the 
subsequent fire scenario will involve several wells.  
In the report “Fareanalyse av lekkasjer i tubinghanger på brage”, it is evaluated that probability for the 
plugs tighten with “lock-tight to start to leak is high. There are reasons to believe that the same applies 
for the situation at Oseberg East. It is therefore recommended an to increase the focus on check-rounds 
to ensure the plugs are tightened and in the long run replace “lock-tight” with “Autoclave” or 
“Butech”. 
The deluge at Oseberg East will make the subsequent fire scenario controllable.  
 
9.11.3. Escalation to uncontrolled blow out  
 
An uncontrolled blow out is a leakage where all the barriers against the reservoir has failed.  
An uncontrolled blow out is unlikely for a scenario where the seals in the WH are degraded or 
completely damaged. If however such an unlikely event occurs the kill pressure for bull heading 
should be reevaluated as the design rating of the seals in the WH are degraded.  
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9.12. Operational risks related to monitoring and maintenance of C1 
 
When the pressure reaches 34,5 bar, it is a common practice to bleed off the pressure. This is a manual 
operation and there exists procedures for the execution of the work. The operation is however time 
consuming due to the access difficulties to the nipples/test ports. 
It is common to bleed of the pressure directly to the atmosphere, where the operator executing the 
work is located. 
There are reasons to believe that the maintenance frequency related to this operation will have to be 
performed more frequently in the future. In that case, automatic pressure relief in connection to the 
high pressure flare is recommended.  
 
 
9.13. Danger indications of multiple leakages  
 
From the previous case studies of leakages in connection to C1, it appears that it is a possible scenario 
that leakages from different seals might occur simultaneously.  In the case of simultaneous leakage 
(damaged S1, S3 and communication through control lines) the pressure in C1 could increase to a 
critical value in a shorter time period. The volume of C1 is in connection to S2 which again is 
connected to the atmosphere, is however still the same (25liter). The case has to be evaluated again as 
a small volume (C1), in connection to a bigger volume (the volume of the tubing down to DHSV 
(9,58m
3
) and/or the volume of A-annulus down to ASV (32,95 m
3
 )and the volume of the control 
lines). The connected volume to C1 will cause an eventually fire to last longer or create a bigger 
stoichiometric cloud.  
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10. DISCUSSION 
 
Minor gas leakages in the WH area do not only exist at the Oseberg East installation. Other Statoil 
installations such as Brage has  reported similar cases. In addition, other companies such as Shell and 
ConocoPhillips have also reported similar concerns and are working simultaneously to solve the 
problem.  
Since it has not been a common practice over the last years to test the relevant seals after installation, 
it is difficult to evaluate the extent of this problem as very limited test data exist. In addition, integrity 
issues in connection to the small cavities related to C1 do often not affect the A- and/or B-annulus 
pressure. They are therefore difficult to detect. It should be mentioned that the first detected leakage in 
connection to C1 was detected by an operator performing a “sniff test” during the daily check round in 
the WH area.  
The information reviewed in this thesis as well as general information from other companies on the 
NCS show that: 
 The problems related to leakages in WH often occurs typically within 2-3 years after the wells 
have been put on gaslift  
 Seals are not optimized, designed and properly tested for long term gas integrity 
The test results, as well as statistics from the pressure monitoring do not always give unambiguously 
results and conclusions. This may indicate that the potential leakages not always are actual leakages 
caused by a mechanical failure of the seal. Dirt and residual hydraulic oil from installation may cause 
pressure disturbances which may lead to an erroneous conclusion.  Vibrations in the wellhead may 
cause small drops of fluid to penetrate the seal and thereby cause the pressure in the cavity to rise 
slowly, without an existing mechanical failure of the seal.  
The problems related to vibration are reduced on more recent completed wells, where Autoclave or 
Butech fittings in test ports are being used. On older wells were NPT fittings are in use, it is 
recommended to increase focus on maintenance of the fittings.  
In addition a campaign to drain out excessive hydraulic oil from test ports on all wells should be 
initiated. The practice to always drain out the fluids after tests, installations and maintenance should 
also be included in the “best practice” manual.    
A common remedy to deal with leakages from seals has been to treat the leakage with a sealant (Val-
Tex 80).  The procedure for treatment with a sealant is to inject the grease through a test port, but the 
treatment shows variations in results. It is recommended to inject the sealant from two different test 
ports in the opposite direction of one other, in order to ensure an optimal sealing effect through the 
cavity. (To ensure that the sealant flows into and covers the whole area). The use of sealants should 
however always be evaluated carefully as injection of the grease through a test port removes the 
possibility for further pressure and or temperature monitoring through that port. In addition treatment 
with sealants does not satisfy the requirement regarding fire integrity. 
In order to monitor the pressure in the cavity, pressure transmitters or indicators has to be installed at 
the wellhead. Not many wells on the Norwegian continental shelf have this type of pressure 
monitoring. On Oseberg East the well A-1, A-2 and A-3 have the following equipment: 
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Table 15 Pressure monitoring equipment 
Cavity A-1 A-2 A-3 
Tubing Transmitter Transmitter Transmitter 
C1 Transmitter Transmitter Transmitter 
SRL-cavity Indicator Indicator Indicator 
10 3/4" hanger cavity Indicator Indicator Indicator 
13 3/8" hanger cavity Indicator Indicator None 
A-annulus Transmitter Transmitter Transmitter 
B-Annulus Transmitter Transmitter Transmitter 
 
It is recommended that such pressure monitoring should be installed on other wellheads where there 
exist indications of leakages. However, installation of pressure transmitters or indicators at test ports 
should also be evaluated considering the negative effect on the fire integrity. The fittings in the test 
ports are in principle not fire resistant but the fire jacket normally installed around the WH is a 
compensating measure. The integrity and functionality of the fire jacket becomes weakened by using 
transmitters or indicators on the wellhead.    
C1 should not see pressure under normal conditions. Since the trends shows that this is not always the 
case, it is therefore recommended to avoid installations of unidirectional seals, such as the SRL-seal, 
on any further future wells until design other general improvements have been made. It is 
recommended to use seals such as Cameron’s CAHN or a general double tandem seal.  The use of 
tandem seal requires the pressure between the two seals to be lower than the pressure between the two 
seals. It is therefore crucial to choose a solution with venting of the disposed heat from temperature 
induced pressure between the seals. 
In general it is recommended that unidirectional seals should not be used in WH-configurations where 
there is a probability for the production well to be put on gas lift. History shows that the elastomer 
seals originally installed on the WHs on Oseberg East are not suitable to be used for sealing in gas lift 
wells. There is therefore a risk that C1will be exposed to pressure and thereby also the SRL seal from 
the opposite direction of what it is designed for. 
If it is desired to put producers on gas lift, the design criteria on every element should always be 
thoroughly checked and it is recommended that Cameron’s design criteria should be met. If the 
specifications of the seals are only met by dry gas, a conversion to gas lift wells is not recommended.  
There exists examples on the NCS were the test ports in connection to C1 have permanently been 
plugged after WH installation. This solution is not recommended, as this will result in losing the 
monitoring possibility of the cavities. Thereby the leakages might in worst case scenario only be 
detected after reaching the atmosphere.  
All of the three wells that have been evaluated in this thesis are gas lift wells. Examples of similar 
cases are from Shell are also from gas lift wells. Since there is such limited test data, it is difficult to 
draw a conclusion regarding whether the leakages are only a problem related to gas lift wells or 
whether the problem might exist on other types of wells as well. To be able to conclude, further tests 
on all types of wells has to be performed. 
An indication of that the problem might not only be linked to gas lift wells are worries regarding test 
of DHSV.  During a DHSV the SRL seal will see a significant higher differential pressure towards the 
tubing, as the pressure in the tubing above the DHSV will be bled off before commencement of the 
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test.  If there is already pressure behind the SRL seal which is higher than the atmospheric pressure, 
there might be risk for the differential pressure to increase above design limits. Such scenario, are as 
likely for gas lift wells, as well as for any other types of wells. It is therefore recommended to always 
bleed of the pressure in C1 and the SRL-test port before commencement of a DHSV test. 
A summary of the calculation performed related to the cases presented are shown in table below: 
Table 16 Summary, expected pressure in C1 & leak rates 
 
Expected pressure in 
C1 and/or test ports 
 
Comments 
Tubing P (Leak through S1) ≈75 °C   
Injection P (Leak through S3) ≈120 Bar   
Control line P (Leak through S3) <600 Bar   
Temp induced P water/oil filled C1 (WCS) 751 Bar   
Temp induced P air/gas filled C1 (WCS) Δ 5 Bar   
Fire induced P water/oil filled C1 ˃ 345 (WH design P) Bar    
Fire induced P air/gas filled C1 ˃ 345 (WH design P) Bar 
This applies for the 
cases where C 
originally sees either 
injection P or CL P 
        
Leak rate to the atm with 1 mm² hole 
opening < 0,1 kg/s   
 
It should be noted that the leak rates are based on 1mm
2 
 hole opening which is evaluated as the most 
likely scenario. In cases of a bigger hole openings or in the case of a completely damaged seal to the 
atmosphere it is evaluated that there exist a risks for the gas detectors to detect the leakages. When the 
gas detector detects gas in the WH, an automatic shutdown of the production occurs.  A shutdown of 
the production will lead to economic losses. On the other hand, this has not yet proven to be a 
problem.   
 
The calculations for the stociometric clouds in  chapter “9.10.1Escalation of the leakage to the 
atmosphere” are based on the WH configuration at Brage. The calculated gas cloud sizes do give an 
indication regarding the possible cloud size at Oseberg East. It is however recommended to carry out a 
new risk evaluation for Oseberg East in order to be able to evaluate the explosion and fire case more 
precisely.   
Injection of nitrogen gas in cavities  
The main risks related to leakages in the seals are driven be the case of fire and/or explosion. To 
mitigate this risk it is proposed to replace the fluid in the WH cavities with nitrogen gas. Nitrogen gas 
and air are a stable composition and will not cause auto-ignited chemical explosion explosions. 
(firesandexplosion) 
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A stoichiometric cloud of a mixture of nitrogen, hydrocarbons and air will also be less flammable 
compared to stoichiometric cloud of only air and hydrocarbons.  
In addition the thermal heat expansion coefficient for nitrogen gas is less than for air. Hence the 
effects of thermal induced pressure will also be less. 
There is however HSE issues regarding use nitrogen gases in high consecration that must be taken into 
consideration.  
 
Exceeded design capacities  
Due to unambiguous test results it is difficult to point out on clear conclusion regarding the cause of 
the leakages.  Several aspects have been mentioned already. In addition there are reasons to believe 
that design capacities for the wells A-1, A-2 and A-3 have been exceeded and therefore might have 
caused damage on the seals.  
All of the three wells were designed as gas lift wells with following specifications: 
 Design temperature  29°C- 82°C  
 The gas in connection with the WH should also be of dry quality (no fluids or injected 
chemicals) 
After the wells were put on gas lift, there have been instances where the design capacities of the WH 
have been exceeded. The gas that has been injected has held a higher temperature than what the 
elastomer seals installed in the WH are designed to meet. In addition the injection gas has not been of 
dry quality. This may have led to leakages through the elastomer seals/fitting as they are neither 
designed to see such high temperatures nor to see the wet gas.  
It has also been reported from Cameron that there has been injected corrosion inhibitor into the well 
which are corrosive against black steel. (Used in WHs in other wells at the Oseberg East installation) 
 
10.1. Acceptance criteria for leakages 
 
10.1.1. Internal WH leakages 
 
According to API 14B, the allowable leak rate of SSSVs has been defined as: 
 0.42 Sm3/min (25.5 Sm3/hr) (900 scf/hr) for gas 
 0.4 l/min for liquid 
This requirement can be used providing the observation volume is adequately large to give meaningful 
tests and the valves or seals are connected to a closed system. In the case related to C1 the volumes 
that are being evaluated are too small in order to successfully meet the API requirement.  See Figure 
49Hence, more conservative acceptance criteria for the leakages in connection to the wellhead should 
be defined.  
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Figure 49 API & OLF comparison of leak rates (Sally Serenyi) 
For situations where the leak-rate cannot be monitored or measured, a criterion for maximum 
allowable pressure fluctuation can be established. 
Since it has been evaluated internally in Statoil that the unidirectional seals does tolerate more than 10 
% of the design rate from the opposite direction, it is evaluated that the unidirectional seal should not 
see higher pressure than 34,5 bar from the opposite direction of what the seal is designed for. Before 
the pressure in C1 reaches 34,5 bar the pressure should then manually be bled off to approximately the 
atmospheric pressure. It is therefore evaluated that the acceptance criteria should be 35bar/24h. 
It is recommended that leak testing should be performed as a minimum the first time after 12 months. 
If the test is satisfactory, the test interval can be increased to maximum 24-monthly. 
For barrier seals that could be exposed to gas, nitrogen is the recommended preferred test medium. 
Remaining seals are to be tested with water / hydraulic oil. This is to ensure that the test is as realistic 
as possible. 
The test shall last for a sufficient time period so that any leakage can be detected. It is therefore e 
recommended that the test duration should be minimum 10 min. In the case of unambiguous test 
results, it is recommended d to extend the variation of the test.  
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10.1.2. Leakages to the atmosphere  
 
Norsok D-010 states that there should be zero leakages to the atmosphere.  
Norsok Z-013 states that leakages with a leak rate below 0,1kg/s will not contribute to risk for 
explosion. 
Based on the calculation from this thesis as well as the two requirements above, it is recommended to 
consider a accept criteria of less than 0,1 kg/s to the atmosphere under deviation. It is indicated that 
this leak rate will not contribute explosion risk. However, a leak rate below 0,1kg/s might contribute to 
minor environmental consequences.  Compensatory measures such as an increased focus on 
cleanliness around the WH should than be initiated.  
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11. CONCLUSION 
 
Conclusion, leakages to the atmosphere  
A review of the barriers on the gaslift wells A-1, A-2, A-3 concludes that the well has in the first place 
two independent barriers that are possible to test. S2 and S4 give an additional third barrier and 
increased safety against leakages to the atmosphere in case S1 or S3 fails. It is not possible to test S2 
and S4 with an unambiguous result, without introducing a risk to damage S1. 
It is evaluated that the frequency of the leakages to the atmosphere is expected to increase. It is in 
particular expected that the total number of leakages will increase trough the test ports. 
The consequences of these leakages are evaluated to be negligible relative to the rates of leakages that 
are considered to contribute to risk of explosion and/or fire. 
It should however be pointed out the leakages could be significant enough to be detected be the gas-
detector and thereby cause the production at the installation to be shut down. On the other hand, this 
has not yet proven to be a problem.   
The test ports should be monitored and an increased focus on maintenance should be initiated. With 
this initiative, leaks to the environment are considered to represent a negligible risk. 
It is a severe escalation of the leakage to C1, if the consequence is that S1 in addition becomes 
weakened. This danger is reduced by being able to monitor the pressure between the elastomer seal 
and S1. 
 
Proposed actions: 
The recommendations after performed test of seal in WH follow: 
If the test was cleared ok: 
 The barrier and the well is in accordance with: 
 Norsok D-010 
 Statoil well integrity policy 
 The well can then be put back on production again 
If the test was not cleared ok: 
 The seal/element failed the function of being a well barrier element 
 Raise a deviation to flow the well under compensating measures in anticipation of a work over 
to be carried out.  
It is recommended that the compensating measures should be evaluated in accordance to a similar 
table as the one below  
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Table 17 Likelihood, consequece, risk and compesating measures 
Scenario Likelihood Consequence  Risk  Compesating 
measures 
Leaking seal 
Short term 
Medium: 
Based in barrier 
element design 
and track record 
Medium: Small 
leakages to 
atmosphere, 
unscrewing plugs 
at high back 
pressure 
Acceptable: 
Acceptable with 
compensating 
measures 
 Increased 
monitoring/surveill
ance 
 Spray foam around 
test plugs to be 
able to detect leaks 
more easily. 
 Install autoclave 
plugs (bleed and 
test plugs) with 
option to monitor 
pressure behind 
Long term 
High: Based in 
barrier element 
design and 
track record 
High: The leakage 
is not expected to 
escalate 
significantly 
Not acceptable: 
The risk of having 
leakages to the 
atmosphere is 
significant  
Workover 
 
 
In addition other short term solutions that should be evaluated are: 
 Seal repair with chemical sealant 
 Monitor and always log the bleed off medium to more easily be able to identify the source of 
the leakage  
The long term solution compensating measures: 
 Evaluate injection of nitrogen to cavities 
 Pressure alarms on transmitters to ensure that the pressure do not exceed the predefined limit 
 Improvements in maintenance of the WH 
 Develop, test and qualify new  design for seal assemblies/wellheads/tubing hangers  
 Workover of XT/WH 
 
During the daily visualization round there should be a focus on visual inspection  
 Plug movement  
 Seeping fluid and/ or foam from plugs  
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Campaign: 
 Drain out the hydraulic oil left after installation, on all wells 
 Tighten fittings in all test ports 
Best practice: 
 Always drain out the hydraulic oil used during installation or tests 
 Increase focus on cleanliness during installation of the seals to avoid residual dirt and 
scratches on the seal surfaces 
 Increased focus on training to be able to use the stinger tool and proper execution of the 
maintenance and test of seal 
 Bleed of pressure in C1 and SRL-testport cavity before performing test on DHSV, CT-
operations or permanent abandonment of the well  
Recommendation to operations: 
 Operate the well with limits on C1 pressure 
 Suggested :  
o 35 bar/24hr for internal leakages  
o 0,1 kg/s  for leakages  to the atmosphere  
 
 Recommendation for further work 
 Select data to create statics of the leakages, with data regarding frequency   
 Evaluate the effect of injection of nitrogen gas into cavities. 
 Evaluate the need for a new risk evaluation for Oseberg East in order to be able to estimate the 
explosion and fire risk more precisely.   
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12. Key terms and definitions 
 
Fail safe close: 
This means that the valves will automatically close if the signal or hydraulic control pressure is lost. 
 
Gas decompression requirement/ explosive decompression: 
Rapid pressure drop in a gas containing system causes the gas trapped inside an elastomer (polymer) 
to expand. The pressure drop rate must be faster than the diffusion rate of the gas inside the polymer 
(standard, 1994) 
 
Soap/ foam test: 
A test performed to check for leakages to the atmosphere.  A gas leakage can then be difficult to 
detect. To facilitate the detection of gas a fluid like “soap” is greased on the interface that is under 
investigation. I the case of a leakage, the soap will develop bubbles which are easy to detect.  
 
Tandem seals:  
Two seals set in the opposite direction of each other, sealing the same gap. 
 
Unidirectional seals: 
Seal of this type are single acting, which means that by pressure energization is effective in one 
direction only.  
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13. Abbreviations 
 
C1- XT cavity 
Csg- casing 
MD-measured depth 
M2M- Metal to metal  
P-pressure 
S1- SRL seal 
S2- metal seal 
S3- Tubing hanger seal assembly 
S-3- metal seal 
WH- Wellhead 
WB- Well barrier 
WBEs- Well barrier elements  
WCS- Worst Case Scenario 
XT- Christmas Tree 
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15. APPENDIX 
 
15.1. Basic calculation examples 
 
15.1.1. Pressure increase in C1, oil/water filled cavity 
 
From the method of temperature induced B-annulus pressure 
 
   (
  
 
)         
Eq.4 
Ex: 
         
       
In the simulation it is assumed that the relation between the compressibility of the fluid and the heat 
expansion coefficient are the same for oil and water. 
(
  
 
)
     
 (
  
 
)
   
 (
         
          
)  
Hence: 
   (
         
          
  
 
)                          
 
The same method is used for pressure increase due to fire. 
 
15.1.2. Pressure increase in C1, gas/air filled cavity 
 
From the method of ideal gas 
       
V, n, R –assumed constant 
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Ex:  
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The same method is used for pressure increase due to fire. 
 
 
 
15.1.3. Rate of leakage 
  
   
         
 
Eq. 11 
This equation can be used to determine the rate of leakage.  
  √
         
 
 
Ex: 
       
        2,437802151 
 
                      
 
 
  √
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15.2. Additional simulations  
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Table 18 P increas in C1, oil/water filled 
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Table 19 P increase in C1, air/gas filled 
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15.3. Test of A-1 & A-2 
 
Test A-1 
1. Summary - Test August 2012 / pressure trends /bleed off 
Item no 1: Information /  
1: Test (1) Blødde ned XT cavity (F) fra 40 til 12 bar. Blødde av XXXX  
??? Blødde TH seal monitor port cavity (G) fra 20 til 11 bar. Blødde av XXXX ???? 
 
~Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)                                    12 bar 
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)   11 bar 
- SRL seal monitor port cavity (H)  - 
- Gass løft trykk/A annulus             126 bar (gass) 
- Tubing                                              18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
Trykk endring ~1 time monitoring: 
- XT cavity (F)                                    12,1 bar til 13,4 bar  + 1,3 bar 
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)   10,6 bar til 12,0 bar  + 1,4 bar 
2: Test (2a) Trykk op mellom TH seals (G) fra 13,5 til 150 bar med nitrogen. 
 
Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)                                       12 bar 
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)     150 bar 
- Gas løft trykk/A annulus                 126 bar (gass) 
- Tubing                                                18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
Trykk endring 1 time monitoring: 
- XT cavity (F)                                      12,0 bar til 12,2 bar  + 0,2 bar 
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)     150,6 bar til 150,9 bar  + 0,3 bar 
2:Test 2b) Blødde ned TH seal monitor port cavity (G) fra 151,2 bar til 7,0 bar, blødde av XXXX 
 
Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)                                      4,3 bar 
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)     7,0 bar 
- Gas løft trykk/A annulus                 126 bar (gass) 
- Tubing                                                18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
Trykk endring 3,5 time monitoring: 
- XT cavity (F)                                      4,3 til 4,7 på 1 timer (TH seal 8,0 bar) 
                                                           4,3 til 5,0 bar                                   + 0,7 
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)    7,0 til 9,3 bar                                    + 2,3 
6/28/2013  
 Page 111 of 123 
2:Test 2c) Blødde ned TH seal monitor port cavity (G) fra 9,3 bar til 1.3 bar  
 
Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)                                      5,0 bar 
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)     1,3 bar 
- Gas løft trykk/A annulus                 126 bar (gass) 
- Tubing                                                18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
 
Trykk endring 14 time monitoring: 
- XT cavity (F)                                      5,0 til 5,3 bar            + 0,3 bar 
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)    1,3 til 5,5 bar            + 4,2 bar 
3:Test (3) Blødde ned SRL seal monitor port cavity (H) fra x til x.  Lit crude oil observer ved av 
blødning. 
Seal holding after bleed off – need Plot of SRL seal holding?? 
 
4: Test (4) 
Ikke utført 
Possible further work?? 
Blø ned SRL seal monitor port cavity til ~1 bar. Hvilken fluid? 
Blø ned A-annulus ~0 bar. Hvilken fluid? 
Blø ned XT cavity ~0 bar. Hvilken fluid? 
Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)     ~0 bar  
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)  20 bar 
- SRL seal monitor port cavity (H)  ~ 1 bar 
- Tubing      18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
- A-annulus       ~0 bar (gass) 
Trykk endring X time monitorering: 
=> XMT cavity (F)    ? 
=> SRL seal monitor port cavity (H) ? 
=> Tubing      ? 
5:  
Pressure 
trends: 
- A, B, C 
annulus  
- 10 ¾” 
seal  
- 13 3/8” 
seal 
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6: Pressure 
trends:  
- XT cavity 
- SRL seal 
cavity 
- Tubing 
- TH seal 
 
7: Bleed of 
from 
- SRL seal 
cavity 
- XT cavity 
- TH seal 
cavity 
From : 13-July-2012 
XT cavity (F):  Blødde av ~31-35 til 6-13 bar hver 4-6 days 
                             Ikke er rapportert men ta fra plot over.  
  Avblødd media: Gass 
SRL seal (H)*:       
                     SRL seal øker til 7 bar straks etter avblødning (25, 26 & 27 Aug) 
                             SRL seal øker til 10 bar straks etter avblødning (18 Sept) 
  Avblødd media: Gass 
 
TH seal (G):    Ikke er rapportert 
 
*SRL seal blødde av fra 65 til 10 bar (23-Mar-2012)  
Avblødd media: Hydraulikk væske/damp 
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*************************************Cameron 
Report********************************** 
 
 
General 
Customer Statoil. Well No  
Company Rep Tom Jensen Field Oseberg 
Service Tech(s) Einar Veim. Rig Øst 
Activity . 
Departure Date  
Release 
Date 
 
 
 
Installation 
System Type 18 5/8” SMCC 
Flange/Connector 
Type 
18 5/8” Fastlock 
Pressure Rating 6500 PSI Actual Pressure 
Tubing 18 bar.  
Gas lift 126 bar 
CSG Size N/A Tubing Connection  
Interface Seal Type 18” CF Tree Cap Connection  
 
 
Date Time Activity 
12/8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13:30 
14:00 
14:30 
15:00 
15:30 
16:00 
16:30 
17:00 
17:30 
Rigget opp Nvision test instrument på cavity test port og tubing hanger test port.  
Blødde av trykket I cavity til 10 bar. Trykk I tubing hanger test port 12 bar. 
Gass løft trykk 126 bar. 
Monitorerte trykket i mellom tubinghanger seals og i cavity i 1 time. 
Etter 1 time var cavity trykket 13 bar og trykket mellom tubinghanger seals 12 bar. 
 
Pumpet opp trykket mellom tubinghanger seals til 150 bar. Cavity trykk fremdeles 12 bar og 
gass løft trykk 126.bar. 
Etter en time var tubinghanger seals trykket 150 bar og cavity trykket på 12 bar. 
Blødde trykket mellom tubing hanger seals til 7,03 bar og cavity trykket til 4,35 bar.  
Startet logging og fikk følgende resultat: 
Tubing hanger seals 7,03 bar. Cavity 4.35 bar. Gass løft 126 bar. 
Tubing hanger seals 7,63 bar. Cavity 4.64 bar. Gass løft 126 bar. 
Tubing hanger seals 8,09 bar. Cavity 4.77 bar. Gass løft 126 bar. 
Tubing hanger seals 8,34 bar. Cavity 4.85 bar. Gass løft 126 bar. 
Tubing hanger seals 8,59 bar. Cavity 4.91 bar. Gass løft 126 bar. 
Tubing hanger seals 8,79 bar. Cavity 4.96 bar. Gass løft 126 bar. 
Tubing hanger seals 9,01 bar. Cavity 4.99 bar. Gass løft 126 bar. 
Tubing hanger seals 9,25 bar. Cavity 5.02 bar. Gass løft 126 bar. Avsluttet logg. 
Startet ny logge sekvens. Logge sekvensen vil stå å gå til I morgen tidlig. 
Trykk ved start test: 
Tubing hanger seals 1,32bar. Cavity 5.07 bar. Gass løft 126 bar 
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13/8 07:30 Avsluttet monitoring av trykk. Etter 14 timers logg var trykkene følgende: 
Tubing hanger seals 5,50bar. Cavity 5.34 bar. Gass løft 126 bar 
Dette indikerer veldig liten lekkasje fra annulus til cavity, om det i det hele tatt skal kalles 
lekkasje. 
SRL seal holder tett. Ved avblødning av trykk bak sealet kom det litt crude oil i retur, men når 
avblødning ble stengt igjen holdt sealet tett. Trykket ble observert i 14 timer uten 
trykkoppbygning bak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Summary – SEAL STATUS 
Pressure in cavity Pressure 
betrween TH 
seals 
Elapsed Time hh:mm:ss 
 TH seal - 12-aug-12, 10:16:50, 24430 
bar G bar G
Cavity pressure Tubing hanger 
seals 
Elapsed Time hh:mm:ss 
 TH seal long test- 12-aug-12, 05:31:13, 50775 
bar G bar G
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 Seals Integrity Reference 
SRL seal monitor port 
cavity 
SRL seal (A) JA! (3) Lit crude oil observer ved av blødning 
(6) Stabilt trykkt ~24 bar (3 uke) 
Elastomer seal 
(B) 
Inconclusive Need more info – eg SRL seal test 
XT Cavity Elastomer seal 
(B) 
CF-18 gasket (C)  JA Daglig "sniffe runde", ingen indikasjoner på 
lekkasje. 
Exit block JA Daglig "sniffe runde", ingen indikasjoner på 
lekkasje. 
Control line feed 
thru fittings (D) 
NEI Tester (1) og (2) viser på trykkoppbygging i XT cavity 
men at TH seal holder tett. Då er gjennom 
utelukkingsmetoden lekkasje gjennom kontroll linjer 
gjennomføringer.  
 
Plotter (6) viser på langsiktige trykk oppbygning i XT 
cavity.  
 
Rapporter (7) viser at gass er avblødd fra XT cavity. 
TH seal (E)-upper JA (2) Test tyder på at øvre seal er ok med ~150 bar og 
12 bar i XT cavity og 126 bar i A-annulus 
 
 
Tubing hanger seal 
monitor port cavity 
TH seal (E)-upper 
TH seal (E)-lower JA! (6) Trend viser at trykk bygges opp 6 til 35 bar på 2 
mån. under denne tid har det trykket oppnåtts flere 
ganger i XT cavity 
10 ¾” seal monitor port 
cavity 
10 ¾” seal - upper JA! (5) Stabilt ~95 bar +/- 5 bar (1,5 mån) 
A-annulus stabilt ~130bar +/-  5 bar 
10 ¾” seal - lower JA! (5) Stabilt ~95 bar +/- 5 bar (1,5 mån) 
Stabilt B annulus ~45 bar +/- 2 bar 
13 3/8” seal monitor port 
cavity 
13 3/8” seal-
upper 
JA! (5) Trend viser trykk økning, 14-16 bar (1,5 mån. 
B annulus stabilt ~45 bar +/- 2 bar 
13 3/8” seal-
lower 
JA! (5) Trend viser trykk økning, 14-16 bar (1,5 mån. 
C annulus  - no functional C annulus 
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Test A-2 
1. Summary - Test August 2012 / pressure trends /bleed off 
Item no 1: Information /  
1: Test (1) 
 
Blødde ned XT cavity(F) fra X bar til 10 bar,  blødde av XXXX. 
~Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)     10 bar  
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)  20 bar 
- SRL seal monitor port cavity (H)  - 
- Tubing     18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
- A-annulus      120 bar (gass) 
Trykk endring ~1 time monitoring: 
=> XMT cavity (F)    10,8 bar til 11,2 bar.  + 0,4 bar 
=> TH seal monitor port cavity (G) Stabilt 20,4 bar til 20,5 bar  + 0,1 bar 
2:  Test 
(2) 
Trykkte opp TH seal monitor port cavity (G) til 150 bar med nitrogen.  
~Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)     11 bar  
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)  20 bar 
- SRL seal monitor port cavity (H)  - 
- Tubing      18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
- A-annulus      120 bar (gass) 
Trykk endring ~1 time monitorering: 
=> XMT cavity (F)    11,2 bar til 11,4 bar.  + 0,2 bar 
=> TH seal monitor port cavity (G) Stabilt: 150,8 bar til 149,5 bar - 1,3 bar 
3:  Test 
(3) 
Blødde ned SRL seal monitor port cavity (H) fra X bar til 0 bar, blødde av XXXX. 
~Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)     12 bar  
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)  - bar 
- SRL seal monitor port cavity (H)  0 bar 
- Tubing      18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
- A-annulus      120 bar (gass) 
Trykk endring ~ 2 timer monitorering: 
=> XMT cavity (F)    11,7 bar til 12,0 bar.  + 0,3 bar 
=> SRL seal monitor port cavity (H) 5,7 bar til 11,4 bar på 20 min (XT cavity 11,7)  
     5,7 bar til 11,9 bar  + 6,2 bar 
4:  Test 
(4)   
- IKKE 
UTFØRT  
Blø ned SRL seal monitor port cavity til ~1 bar. Hvilken fluid? 
Blø ned A-annulus ~0 bar. Hvilken fluid? 
Blø ned XT cavity ~0 bar. Hvilken fluid? 
Trykk ved start av test: 
- XT cavity (F)     ~0 bar  
- TH seal monitor port cavity (G)  20 bar 
- SRL seal monitor port cavity (H)  ~ 1 bar 
- Tubing      18 bar (olje/gass/vann) 
- A-annulus       ~0 bar (gass) 
Trykk endring X time monitorering: 
=> XMT cavity (F)    ? 
=> SRL seal monitor port cavity (H) ? 
=> Tubing      ? 
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5:  
Pressure 
trends: 
- A, B, C 
annulus  
- 10 ¾” 
seal  
- 13 3/8” 
seal 
 
6: 
Pressure 
trends:  
- XT cavity 
- SRL seal 
cavity 
- Tubing 
- TH seal 
 
7: Bleed 
of from 
- SRL seal 
cavity 
- XT cavity 
- TH seal 
cavity 
From 13/7-2012: 
XT cavity (F):  Blødd av ~35 - 10/5 bar hver 5-6 dag.  
  Den siste avblødning i september frekvens på 2 uker. 
  Avblødd media: gass (via mail, ikke i daglig oppfølging) 
 
SRL seal (H):    Blødd av ~35/20 til 5/0 bar to (2) ganger under perioden (8 dager 
mellom) 
  Avblødd media: gass (via mail, ikke i daglig oppfølging) 
  
TH seal (G):    Inget er rapportert. 
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****************************************CAMERON 
REPORT************************************************ 
 
General 
Customer Statoil.   
Company Rep Tom Jensen Field Oseberg 
Service Tech(s) Einar Veim. Rig Øst 
Activity . 
Departure Date  
Release 
Date 
 
 
 
Installation 
System Type 18 5/8” SMCC 
Flange/Connector 
Type 
18 5/8” Fastlock 
Pressure Rating 6500 PSI Actual Pressure 
Tubing 18 bar.  
Gas lift 120 bar 
CSG Size N/A Tubing Connection  
Interface Seal Type 18” CF Tree Cap Connection  
 
 
Date Time Activity 
11/8 13:00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20:00 
Avholdt pre jobb møte. 
Rigget opp Nvision test instrument på cavity test port og tubing hanger test port.  
Blødde av trykket I cavity til 10 bar. Trykk I tubing hanger test port 20 bar. 
Monitorerte trykket i mellom tubinghanger seals og i cavity i 1 time. 
Trykk mellom seals stabilt mens trykket i cavity er svakt stigende. 
 
Trykket opp til 150 bar mellom tubing hanger seal. Trykk i cavity 11 bar. Monitorerte trykket i 
en time. Trykk i cavity er svakt stigende. Trykk i mellom tubing hanger seal er stabilt. 
Disse testene indikerer at tubing hanger seals holder tett mot gassløft trykket. Trykket som 
bygger seg opp i cavity kommer mest sansynlig gjennom kontroll linje gjennomføringene i 
tubing hangeren. 
 
Koblet om Nvision til SRL seal monitor port og cavity test port. 
Blødde SRL seal til 0 bar å beholdt 12 bar i cavity.  
Trykket i SRL seal øker ganske raskt til samme trykk som cavity å flater ut. Monitorer 
trykkene i to timer. Trykket i SRL seal følger trykket i cavity.  
Mest sansynlig lekker gummi sealet mellom cavity og SRL seal. 
 
Vil monitorere trykkene i cavity og SRL seal videre fra kontrollrom for å verifisere lekkasje. 
Rigget ned alt test utstyr fra brønnen å plugget alle testporter. 
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*****************************************CAMERON 
REPORT*********************************************** 
Pressure between 
TH seals 
 Cavity pressure 
Elapsed Time hh:mm:ss 
TH seal - 11-aug-12, 15:06:08, 6888 
bar G bar G
SRL seal pressure Cavity pressure 
Elapsed Time hh:mm:ss 
 SRL seal test - 11-aug-12, 18:16:22, 6469 
bar G bar G
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0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
12,00
14,00
00:00:00,0 00:28:48,0 00:57:36,0 01:26:24,0 01:55:12,0
Series1
Series2
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2. Summary - STATUS TETNINGER  
Cavity / 
Hullrom 
Tetninger Integrity Referens 
SRL seal 
monitor port 
cavity 
SRL seal (A) JA ! 
 
Test (3) flater ut på 12 bar og ikke på 18 bar som er 
tubing trykk. 
 
Rapporter (7) viser at gass er avblødd fra SRL seal 
monitor port  (med et unntak i begynnelsen) og ikke 
olje som i tubing. 
 
Fra trykk plotter (5) er det rapportert høyere trykk i SRL 
seal monitor cavity port enn i tubing. 
Elastomer seal 
(B) 
NEI  
(1 veis?) 
Test (3) viser på kommunikasjon  der SRL monitor port 
følger XT cavity trykk.   
 
Rapporter (7) viser at gass er avblødd fra SRL seal 
monitor port  (med et unntak i begynnelsen) og ikke 
olje som i tubing. 
 
(6) Trend viser at SRL trykk følger XT cavity opp men 
ikke ned. (hvilket kan tyde på en veis lekkasje.)  
XT cavity 
 
Elastomer seal 
(B) 
CF-18 gasket (C) JA Daglig "sniffe runde", ingen indikasjoner på lekkasje.  
Exit block JA Daglig sniffe runde ingen indikering på lekkasje. 
Control line feed 
through fittings 
(D) 
NEI Tester (1) og (2) viser på trykkoppbygging i XT cavity 
men at TH seal holder tett. Då er gjennom 
utelukkingsmetoden lekkasje gjennom kontroll linjer 
gjennomføringer.  
 
Plotter (6) viser på langsiktige trykk oppbygning i XT 
cavity.  
 
Rapporter (7) viser at gass er avblødd fra XT cavity. 
TH seal (E)  
- Upper 
JA (2) Test tyder på at øvre seal er ok med ~150 bar og 12 
bar i XT cavity og 120 bar i A-annulus 
 
 
Tubing hanger 
seal monitor 
port cavity 
TH seal (E)  
- Upper 
TH seal (E)  
- Lower 
JA ! (6) Trend viser at trykk bygges opp 5 til 30 bar på 5 uker 
under denne tid har det trykket oppnåtts flere ganger i 
XT cavity. 
10 ¾” seal 
monitor port 
cavity 
10 3/4” seal () 
- upper  
JA! (5) Trend viser trykk økning fra 40 til 60 bar (2 måneder) 
Stabilt A-annulus trykk på ~120 bar. 
10 3/4” seal () 
- lower 
JA (5) Trend viser trykk i seal over B-annulus trykk og 
stabilt B annulus trykk tyder på at nedre seal er tett.  
13 3/8” seal 
monitor port 
cavity 
13 3/8” seal () 
- upper  
JA ! (5) Trend viser trykk økning, 10 til 25 bar (2 mån.) 
B-annulus stabilt på ~45 bar. 
13 3/8” seal () 
- lower  
JA ! (5) Trend viser trykk økning, 10 til 25 bar (2 mån.) 
C-annulus stabilt på ~ 60 bar +/- 10 bar 
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